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ECONOMIC AID AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY:
THE CASE OF GHANA
1957-1966
Patricia Masilo Hoeane, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1981
This study examines the role of aid in Soviet policy
toward Ghana during the Nkrumah era.

Since aid is seen

as a means to counter Western and Chinese influence, the
paper seeks to establish the extent to which Soviet foreign
policy met its goals in Ghana.

It also examines the ac

tions of other nations which had vested interests that
ran counter to Soviet aspirations.

An argument is made

that in so far as Soviet aid was used as a response to
Western influence it was an inadequate instrument of
policy due to its insignificant quantity.

In so far as

it was used to counter Chinese influence, it was handi
capped by its operational methods which were less lenient.
The paper concludes that Soviet aid was a failure in its
challenge against the West but was successful in enhancing
Ghana's political autonomy and bargaining position with
the West.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
The subject of Soviet foreign policy has always at
tracted immense interest among policy makers and scholars
ever since the inception of a Communist government in
Russia.

My particular interest in the topic is evoked by

the belief that such a study, especially with its emphasis
on the aid aspect of Soviet policy is justified if only for
two reasons.

First and foremost, as we move into the new

decade of the eighties with its currently uncertain inter
national

atmosphere, it would appear that some of the ear

lier popular assumptions made about the direction of Soviet
policy in Africa have been rendered obsolete by the tide of
events not only in Africa but in other parts of the world
as well.

The past seven years have witnessed a significant

and dramatic change in the international system with inci
dents such as the liberation of Guinea-Bissau, Angola,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe now a political

reality.

This

period has also experienced a change in super-power rela
tions with the launching of a U.S. policy that has succeeded
in improving relations with Post-Mao China while simultane
ously bringing Soviet-American relations to their lowest ebb.
On

other fronts, revolutionary upheavals have ushered in

new governments in places as far apart as Ethiopia, Nicaragua

1
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and Iran.

The active role played by the Soviet Union in

some of the above-mentioned regions, either through exten
sion of economic aid or diplomatic support calls for a re
assessment of earlier suppositions, especially amongst
those who viewed the collapse of 'progressive' regimes such
and Nkrumah's as heralding
Africa.

Soviet political impotence in

For although Ghana's military coup of 1966 with

its anti-Soviet overtones did in effect present a serious
political set-back for Moscow in Africa, it did equally
offer an important opportunity for Soviet policy makers to
learn through trial and error.

The evolution of Soviet

policy since its experiences in Ghana illustrates this point
very well.

For unlike v/hen they first went into Ghana and

deployed their economic offensive with a sense of exagger
ated expectations, the Soviets to all indications do not
now feel compelled to dispense with their rubles at every
mention of the word 'socialism'.

This attitude is indicated

by the fact that even though they have been previously sup
portive of governments such as Mozambique's during libera
tion wars, their offers of economic assistance have not
been as massive as one would have expected under the cir
cumstances.
Apart from the need to reassess Soviet fortunes or
misfortunes in Africa, the second reason for undertaking
this study derives from the importance that Third world
countries such as Ghana attach to the current debate on
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the need to overhaul the present world economic order.
While it would be foolhardy to predict how the rich north
ern hemisphere will eventually address the problem of
grinding poverty afflicting the southern hemisphere, it
is clear that the current gross economic imbalances cannot
continue unabated without serious political consequences
for all nations.

For if these imbalances are not rectified

in time, factors such as the mass migration of people from
economically depressed areas of the world to those with
higher standards of living will ultimately undermine the
economic and political well-being of the rich nations them
selves.

While everybody agrees that what the poor countries

like Ghana need is self-sustaining economic development, no
one seems able or willing to ensure the attainment of that
goal.

For its own part, the Soviet Union, despite its dif

ferent ideological outlook does belong to that exclusive
club of nations that enjoy the benefits of a rich economy.
Like its western counterparts it has also come to recognize
the political importance of Third world countries on the
world scene.

If ever any black African state could claim

such political importance in the sixties Ghana under
Nkrumah would undoubtedly be that country.

It is therefore

worth noting that economic aid emerged as a major tool of
Soviet foreign policy especially at the height of the cold
war when it became strategically important to move competi
tion from the military plane to the economic level.
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Soviet Union also recognized the importance attached to
rapid economic growth by most political leaders of post
independent Africa.

Kwame Nkrumah was such a man; he was

in effect regarded by some as a man too much in a hurry to
stop and rationally assess the economic condition of his
country.
The choice of Ghana as a case study was made on the
basis of the following reasons.

The first and most obvious

lies in the fact that it was the first country in Sub-Saharan
Africa to attain its independence and therefore gives re
searchers an advantage of hindsight because of its longer
time span of relations with the Soviets.

Secondly, because

of the political orientation of Nkrumah regarded by many as
radical at the time, the Soviet Union perceived an oppor
tunity to co-operate with Ghana on major international is
sues that were of concern to her.

There was also a con

vergence of views on matters of economic philosophy between
Nkrumah and the Soviets, a factor which by itself acted as
a catalyst.

For one, Nkrumah had the same view as the

Soviets when it came to the theory of underdevelopment.
Like them he saw it largely as a result or product of
colonial rule.

In one of his books, he remarked once about

how western imperialist countries maintained their hold on
the colonies,

"Through their system of monopolist control,

they eliminate native competition and use the colonies as
dumping grounds for their surplus mass-produced goods"
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(Nkrumah, 1957).

On another matter of economic philosophy

which involved the development path to be followed by poor
countries, Nkrumah seemed to be closer to the Soviet posi
tion than to the western economic theories.

He attacked

the economic notion that developing countries should con
centrate more on agriculture than industry as he believed
a sound industrial base was the only way of raising the
nutritional level of people by raising their level of in
come (Nkrumah, 1965).

This line of thinking was in tune

with the Soviets whose model of development has always as
signed top priority to heavy industry to the detriment of
Soviet agricultural development.

This congruence of views

encouraged Moscow in its search for allies in Africa.
The third reason for focusing on Ghana as a case study
stems from its position as a symbol of everything that is
wrong with African politics.

It symbolizes clearly the en

demic problems of political instability and the social evils
of corruption.

Since independence, the country has experi

enced three military interventions, the first one being the
most profound in terms of Soviet-Ghanaian relations.

Since

then the Soviet Union has had to take into consideration
the vulnerability, not only of 'progressive' regimes but
also its entire policy that seemed to depend on the success
of only one man.

As the 1966 coup showed, the political

gains of economic aid remain hostage to domestic politics.
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Perhaps the most important reason for selecting Ghana
hinges on its economic condition.

Ghana today represents

in so many ways the plight suffered by those nations of the
world that cannot rely on their own internal resources to
sustain their economic momentum and provide a decent stan
dard of living for the majority of their citizens.

Twenty

three years after its 'independence1 from Britain, the
country's economy is near ruins with an external debt that
approximates $1,334.8 million (Bedu, 1980).

The monocul-

tural nature of the economy signified by its overdependence
on cocoa, coupled with currently skyrocketing oil prices
has made mockery of any semblance of economic planning.
This sorry state of affairs has meant in actual terms that
the country has had to mortgage its economic future by put
ting itself at the mercy of international donors.

This

trend began as early as Nkrumah's era when he did accept
the conditions set for him by the World Bank and the Inter
national Monetary Fund in order to receive their financial
support.
Following Lenin's theory of imperialism, Soviet policy
makers viewed countries such as Ghana as the weakest link
in the economic system of the West which had become depen
dent on them as sources of raw materials; which in the case
of Ghana comprised of cocoa, gold, timber, palm oil and
palm kernels and also as markets for Western manufactured
goods.

By the time Ghana became independent in 1957, it
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had become imperative for the Soviets to use their weapon
of economic aid against the West.

Significantly, 1957

was also a dramatic year for the Soviet Union and for
Khrushchev personally.

In that year not only did he carry

out a reorganization program for the economy and success
fully oust his rivals from positions of power, but he also
witnessed the firing of the first intercontinental ballistic
missiles into space by Soviet scientists.

At the height of

such international prestige and domestic consolidation, the
Khrushchevites felt confident enough to challenge western
positions in Ghana and other Third World countries such as
Egypt.

In the process they promised these countries econo

mic liberation that would put a halt to exploitation by
Western monopolies and restore control of their own national
wealth.

Khrushchev was aware of Nkrumah's commitment to

rapid economic development for his country and the internal
political demand for this was clear.

But Khrushchev sought

to differentiate between his government's aid policy and
others when he famously stated the Soviet position,

"We

value trade least for economic reasons and most for poli
tical purposes" (Barghoon, 1964).
This paper seeks to establish to what extent Soviet
foreign policy met its objectives in Ghana despite the loss
of influence which came with the demise of Nkrumah.

The

paper will also examine if Soviet policy was affected by
the actions of other nations that had interests in Ghana
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during Nkrumah's era.

Because of what the hypothesis seeks

to establish an approach utilizing political analysis rather
than economic analysis will be followed.

No attempt will

therefore be made to make any project by project assess
ment as this would be outside the scope of the inquiry and
capacity of research facilities available to the author.
One will notice in this study the changing nature of
Soviet policy as signified by Leninist/Stalinist neglect,
Khrushchev's overzealous involvement and Brezhnev's busi
nesslike approach.

The dispensation of aid was directed

by what the leadership interpreted to be Soviet global in
terests at the time.

Initially, potential economic bene

ficiaries were, as a matter of policy, judged by the direc
tion of their foreign policy and to a lesser extent, their
domestic policy.

This explains why in Ghana Moscow's eco

nomic assistance intensified in the 1960-61 period when
British-Ghanaian relations had taken a downward trend.
The momentum slackened somehow when Khrushchev was replaced
by Brezhnev who brought with him the so-called 'pragmatic
element' to Soviet policy.

In global terms this can be

explained as a reaction to a non-activist U.S. Africa
policy of the Johnson administration.

Since this admin

istration felt that it could bask in the post-Kennedy
legacy of Africa's good will, it took no initiatives in
Africa and attached more importance to its domestic pro
grams.

As a result of this American inertia the Soviet
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Union, in the absence of any western threat, managed to
remain complacent in Ghana.

Such an element of metamor

phosis continued to permeate Soviet aid policy in Ghana
even in the post-Nkrumah years.
For purposes of this paper, economic aid will be un 
derstood to mean all activities encompassing trade rela
tions, medium and long term credit extensions, technical
assistance, grants and even military assistance.

This

study will not follow the United Nations definition of
aid which restricts economic aid only to outright grants
and longterm lending for non military purposes.

This re

stricted definition is not suitable for this particular
study for two reasons.

Because of the type of analysis

utilized in this paper, any form of economic co-operation
between Ghana and the Soviet Union is regarded as poten
tially politically useful due to the fact that, with the
exception of small trade in cocoa beans, the Soviets have
previously not had any economic contact with Ghana.

Se

condly, the author subscribes to the notion that military
aid should be considered an important component of econo
mic aid because it means for the recipient country that
resources that would have otherwise been spent on the
training of military personnel or actual buying of arms
can now be diverted to other important sectors of the
economy.

Most important of all is the fact that the Soviet
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government itself even under different regimes, has al
ways regarded such assistance as part of its overall
foreign aid program.
Ideology and Communist Policy in Africa
For a period of forty years since the Bolsheviks'
ascendancy to power, Soviet foreign policy had ostensibly
shown benign neglect toward the countries of Black Africa.
It should be noted however that the concept of extending
economic aid to potential allies of the Soviet revolution
was itself conceived as early as the Soviet state itself
in 1917 when the Council of Peoples' Commissars appropri
ated 2 million rubles to the

'Left internationalist wing

of the workers' movement of all countries'
1973).

(Taborsky,

But even then the mention of 'all' countries ap

parently meant every other country except the colonial
countries of Africa.

At this point it is important to

understand the theoretical legacy left by the original
formulators of communism; Karl Marx, Engels and Hegel.
The principal theoretician Marx, exhibited a highly Euro
centric approach to international problems and showed no
particular interest in the black, non-western and colonized
nations of Africa.

His colleague Engels, guided by the

same convictions specifically stated in his Principles of
Communism that the communist revolution would take place
only in 'civilized' countries like Britain, France, Germany
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and the U.S.; that is, only those countries where "indus
trial life had already attained a high degree of evolu
tion" (Engels, 1963, p. 333).

Both Marx's and Engel's

basic arguments centered around the Hegelian typology
which perceived Afro-Asian societies as consisting only
of stagnant, primitive communities which essentially need
ed imperialism to modernize them.

According to this

theory modernization would consequently accelerate their
level of historical development and prepare them for the
ultimate international proletarian revolution.

Although

Marx and his co-theorists did not mention Africa by name;
in fact they chose to omit it in most of their writings,
their division of the world into two groups of

'civilized'

and 'uncivilized' nations did by inference and analysis
put Africa in the latter category.

Marx does not explicit

ly mention Africa in any of his known works.

One only

gets fleeting remarks made by Engel on Algeria wherein he
lauds French conquest of Algeria as a fortunate fact for
the progress of civilization.

Much as it would be erroneous

to say that Marx approved of Colonialism as a system of
government it is also evident from his writings that he con
doned it for what he considered its ultimately desirable
socio-political effects on indigenous societies which he
denounced for their brutalizing worship of nature.

Taking

India as a prime example, he stated that "England, no mat
ter how vile her motives and how great her crimes in India"
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remained an unconscious tool of history by bringing about
a fundamental revolution to an otherwise backward social
system (Marx, 1868, pp. 350-351).

In India the evils of

British imperialism consisted of such practices as the ex
propriation of Indian land and resources by British companies,
systematic liquidation of the artisan class through erection
of tariffs against Indian products into England while simul
taneously allowing free entry of British goods into India
(Nehru, 1956).

More or less similar crimes perpetrated

by the British in India were to leave their mark on Ghana
when it was colonized by Britain in 1874.

Under this colonial

system not only were Europeans allowed to move into Ghana
and take over positions in trade and the professions former
ly held by Ghanaians, but there was also deliberate destruc
tion of local industries such as clothmaking, salt, sugar
production and making of pots and containers.

Ghanaians

were encouraged to grow cocoa so as to earn cash to buy
British manufactured goods, a factor that would ensure per
petual dependence on the exchange economy.
In his analysis of Oriental societies such as India
and China, Marx described these areas as having no history
at all.

His concept of history was Eurocentric in that

it limited the definition of history to Western experience
while excluding the majority of mankind.

In his view his

tory simply meant a process where man is able to change
his environment and not subjugate his mind to traditional
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rules.

As he saw it, neither China nor India had history

as their societies were devoid of internal mechanisms of
social change but were mere prey of successive invaders
who founded their empires on the passivity of these unre
sisting and unchanging societies.

According to Marx's

analysis therefore, the theatre of history lay only in
Europe as this was the only continent that provided an
environment where the dialectics of historical development
were operative.

For its own part

'prehistoric' Ghana is

reported to have had a rich civilization before colonial
encroachment of its resources began.

The city of Timbuktu

which was part of the Ghana Empire allegedly had amongst
other things Africans who were well versed in the sciences
and the country's art works were translated into Hebrew
and Greek.

This empire, stretching from Timbuktu to Bamako

reportedly traded in copper, gold and textiles and also
exchanged teachers with the Spanish University of Cordova
(Nkrumah, 1957).

However it finally collapsed in the

eleventh century when it became prey to the attacks of the
Moors of the North.

Despite external interventions such

as these, the history of Ghana cannot be said to have been
that of passive capitulation.

Even before official coloni-

ation of 1874, that is, as early as 1868 the spirit of
nationalism was portrayed when the Fanti Confederation was
formed to resist political encroachments of British mer
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chants and other local forces seeking to dominate the
rest of the country.

There were similar nationalist move

ments later on like the Aborigines Rights Protection Socie
ties and the National Congress of British West Africa that
were to resist external domination of the Gold Coast.

The

significance of all these above mentioned points lies in
the fact that they would repudiate essential ingredients of
Marx's analysis that viewed non-western societies as unre
sisting and unchanging.

However the whole context of Marx's

analysis of Oriental societies and presumably Africa would
necessarily deny countries such as Ghana any place in his
tory because their mode of production, based on common
property lacked dialectical elements of internal change
and in-built dynamism.

Marx's philosophy of history de

manded a process of production which would be everchanging
and leading towards new forms of social organization.
'Unchanging' and therefore

'unhistorical1 societies such

as those of Asia and Africa could not possibly generate
change through their own momentum.

Inorder for a socialist

system to be realized,. capitalism had first to be universa
lized and since the latter could be attained only through
European Colonial aggression such a step was necessary
for the ultimate purpose of world revolution.

But first

the 'barbarian' nations of Africa had to be brought, force
fully if need be into the stream of Western Civilization.
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Contrary to the predictions of Marx the revolutionary
tide that was expected to sweep across Europe and usher in
a new socialist era never materialized.

Instead the revolu

tionary fervour that had accompanied the 1848 uprisings was
beginning to ebb after that date.

Dismayed at this turn

of events, Engels later complained about what he .termed
the 'bourgeois tendencies' of the English proletariat.
In a letter he wrote to Marx in 1858 he accused them of
neglecting their revolutionary mission while they "gaily
share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market
and the colonies" (Lenin, 1916, p. 173).

Until the death

of Karl Marx in 1883 no large scale revolution had occurred
anywhere in Europe apart from the Polish uprising of 1863
and the Paris movement following the Franco-Prussian War.
In the light of these political realities it was
hardly imaginative to complain about the turn of events
in Europe.

If Marxism was to be salvaged from becoming

a bankrupt doctrine new theoretical analyses were exigent.
The mantle of introducing a new dimension to classical
marxism was assumed by Lenin.
gle greatest work, Imperialism:

The publication of his sin
The Highest Stage of

Capitalism in 1916, signalized the abandonment of the ob
solete Hegelian theories that had so much permeated Marxist
thinking on non-western societies.

It is ironic that

Marx's teachings were to become more popular in the Third
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World than in Europe.

But for most who adhered to his

works, it is significant that many were either unaware
or chose to overlook his views on the non-western world.
Notably, Nkrumah was among those who admitted to being
influenced by Marx, Hegel and Engels (Nkrumah, 1957).
While Marx had regarded as the major epistemological ob
stacle to socialism what he called 'the idiocy of village
l i f e 1, Lenin had instead theorized on the potential role
of Afro-Asian countries in Communist strategy.

In one of

the most brilliant analyses to date Lenin illustrated how
capitalism would hamper its own development if it limited
its activities to industrial societies only.

He described

the capitalist system as a mode of production that essen
tially thrived on uneven
tions of the masses.

development and wretched condi

Such an economic system was motivated

solely by profit making and could not utilize its surplus
capital for the betterment of the masses because this would
bring a decline in profits.

But because of the super

abundance of capital it was imperative for the system's
survival to find new outlets of investment.

The poor,

non-western countries with their relatively low land prices,
cheap labour and cheap raw materials offered excellent op
portunities for higher economic returns.

But then, Lenin

theorized, Western economic expansionism could not be suc
cessful on its own and needed colonialism for its estab
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lishment and stability.

England had already experienced

a process of non-expansion within the European perimeter
when other European states had moved to protect themselves
against her by erecting tariffs against her goods.

These

countries had succeeded to establish capitalism within
their borders independently.

But since the British who

had proclaimed their country to be "the workshop of the
world", needed external markets for their capital and
goods, a policy of colonial plunder was embarked upon.
The motives of that policy were explained, crudely as it
was by Cecil Rhodes when he stated that:
In order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the
United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial
statesmen must acquire new lands to settle surplus
population, to provide new markets for the goods
produced in the factories and mines (Lenin, 1916,
p. 126).
British colonization of Ghana assigned the country to the
role of supplier of raw materials such as cocoa and gold
and ensured a new market for British goods.

Lenin argued

from this base that the linking of the capitalist economic
policy with colonial oppression would ultimately provide
the subjugated with the means and resources for their
emancipation (Lenin, 1973).
In Ghana colonial oppression had manifested itself
in various forms such as the denial of political rights
and positions of power in the civil service and army,
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blatant economic exploitation and rampant racism toward
Ghanaian people.

Unlike their French counterparts who at

least spread the myth that cultural assimilation was a
passport to Africans becoming French, the British always
held the view that Africans, even when given the benefit
of education and Christianity could never

'rise' to the

status of the English (Gifford & Louis, 1971).

Racism

was notably more prevalent in British West Africa and
Southern Africa.

Some analysts attribute this factor to

loose post-independence ties between Britain and her ex
colonies while France manages to maintain more intimate
ties with her former colonies

(Cecil

Crabbe,

1968).

Among economic abuses practiced were price-fixing agree
ments pursued by British companies regarding price to be
paid to the cocoa farmers, low wages paid to unskilled
workers in government service so as to keep those in pri
vate mines equally low.

The Leninist theory of imperialism

which predicted final emancipation of colonial people held
true in the case of Ghana which had consistently resisted
British economic and political domination until it finally
won its independence in 1957.
By predicting that the modern class struggle would
spread beyond the borders of Europe to incorporate the
colonized, non-western nations, Lenin had laid the theore
tical foundation for merging that anticipated struggle
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with the socialist revolution of the Soviet Union.

How

ever, despite such a radical reassessment there is no
evidence that Africa ever featured even in Lenin's new
analysis.

On the contrary,

indications are that the en

suing revolutionary exhortations were directed mainly at
Asiatic nations who because of their geographical proximity
were deemed to be more prone to Soviet influence.

Africa

was discounted by the Soviets not only for its geographical
inaccessability but also due to its lack of basic structures
from which local Communist parties could be established.
At the time only South Africa had a Communist party which
Moscow shunned because of its domination by whites.

What

the Soviets were looking for on the continent were revolu
tionary nationalists who could be entrusted with the impor
tant task of organizing the anti-colonial disaffection of
the masses.

Apparently no one, who could fulfil such ex

pectations existed anywhere on the continent.

Because of

this the Soviets dismissed as futile any attempts to make
contact with African people and no effort was made to even
invite their representatives to any of the convocations
sponsored by Moscow.

On the otherhand it remains doubt

ful if the Soviet government could have done anything con
crete at this time even it it had been well disposed toward
Africa.

Lenin had come to power at the most difficult

time in

Soviet history.

Having just suffered the ravages

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

20

of the First World War, the country was plunged into a bit
ter civil war and also had to deal with Allied interven
tion which promoted the cause of the white forces.

Be

cause of these events economic reconstruction became a
top

priority for the new Soviet government.

The adoption

of the New Economic Policy in 1921 required commodity cre
dits and foreign investment for its success.

Such assis

tance was expected from none other than the capitalist
nations of the west.

The necessity to request Western aid

meant that the Soviet government could not have practically
pursued its goal of ". . . raising revolts in those countries
against the capitalists" (Lenin, 1962, p. 141).

Having

realized that the demands of an ambitious and aggressive
policy abroad were too costly, the Lenin government did
the only thing expedient; it decided that the interests
of the Soviet state would come before the interests of the
world revolution.
The subordination of the colonial question to the im
mediate interests of the Soviet state, though seemingly
justified at the time, was, unfortunately to set a pattern
along which future relations with black organizations and
later African governments were to be conducted.

When mea

sures were finally taken to formulate a policy toward
Africa, this was done from the premise that the black Ameri
can is an embodiment of universal black aspirations.
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leaders believed that since the black American had suffered
most under capitalism, a factor illustrated by his de-personalization through slavery, he could therefore be used
to ferment revolution in the land of his ancestors.

This

line of thinking led to active recruitment of black Ameri
cans to Soviet institutions such as Lenin University and
the University of Toilers of the East where curricula em
phasized Marxist/Leninist teaching.

This strategy had two

basic flaws; it ignored the fact that since most black
Americans had never been to Africa they would lack the know
ledge of socio-political conditions necessary for a success
ful ideological crusade.

Secondly, they had now become

part of American culture and like the English proletariat
Engels had complained about, they were developing a bour
geois outlook.

Upon completion of their studies most would

choose to return, not to Africa as expected but to the U.S.
where they believed better chances of social advancement
awaited them.
The low priority assigned to Africa by the Soviet
Union continued well into the Stalinist years.

Although

Stalin had assailed European socialists for ignoring black
people and the fact that the abolition of national op
pression in Europe would be inconceivable without the
liberation of Africa and Asia (Stalin, 1955) he himself
contributed nothing to that task.

In fact his administra

tion was steeped in flagrant inconsistencies between theory
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and practice.

For instance, the Soviet Union contributed

to the demise of the International Trade Union Committee
of Negro Workers when it became evident that continued
support would jeopardize

Soviet interests.

This organi

zation established with the help of Moscow in Hamburg in
1930 had as its main function the co-ordination of revolu
tionary activity between Africa and other areas like the
West Indies.

But with the rise of Hitler in Germany and

the destruction of the German Communist Party there is in
dication that Soviet interest in the organization plummetted dramatically.

In 1933 it was Stalin's government that

signed a non-aggression pact with Italy with the hope of
pre-empting an alliance with Hitler.

But two years later

Italy launched an unprovoked attack on an African country,
Ethiopia.

In response to this aggression, the League of

Nations recommended economic sanctions against Italy, but
the Soviet Union, whose trade with Italy had intensified
since 1934, failed to heed that call.

It continued to

send oil to Italy and some of these deliveries went directly
to Italian troops stationed in Africa.

This act by itself

brought to question the credibility of the Soviet Union
as an ally of Africans against oppression and exploitation.
The signing of the infamous non-aggression pact with Ger
many in August, 1939 did not improve the Soviet image in
Africa.

At one secret meeting between Stalin's foreign
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minister, Joachim Von Ribbentrop,

in November 1940, the Sovi

ets condoned Hitler's seizure of Central Africa in ex
change for recognition of Soviet territorial aspirations
in the Indian ocean (Department of State Documents on NaziSoviet Relations 1939-41, 1962).

When Nazi

Germany showed

no regard for pacts and invaded Soviet territory anyway,
Stalin found himself having to join the war effort on the
side of the Western Allies.

But in order to demonstrate

good intentions, he had to dissolve the Comintern, which
had been formed by Lenin in 1919 to co-ordinate revolution
ary activity around the world.

Not that the dissolution

was a great loss as it had been manipulated greatly by the
Soviet Communist Party and had lacked any direct bearing
on African affairs.

Thus after 1943 its role was assumed

by Metropole Communist Parties;

in the case of Ghana the

task supposedly went to the British Communist Party.

Un

like its counterpart, the French Communist Party in neigh
boring French West Africa, the British Communist Party had
a conspicuously pathetic record in Ghana and is worth ig
noring altogether.
So when Ghana finally won its independence in 1957,
it did so without any help from communist organizations
or from the Soviet Union which had always been the first
country to predict the disintegration of the colonial
system.

It seems ironic that when that disintegration

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

24

finally came, it was the Soviet Union which was caught off
guard and thus failed to appreciate the significance of
the occasion.

Stalinist Russia had further limited its

opportunity by clinging to dogmatic fallacies which re
quired the proletariat of any given country to be the van
guard of revolution to the exclusion of other sectors of
the population.

The two camp

thesis

which arbitrarily

categorized newly independent nations like Ghana as mere
appendages of Western Colonial powers, subjected Soviet
policy to long periods of inactivity at the most important
time in African history.

It is therefore only by under

standing this pre-1957 period that one can clearly appre
ciate the initiatives of Khrushchev which culminated in
the extension of economic aid to Ghana.
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CHAPTER II
THE DECISION TO EMPLOY AID
AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

Favorable Conditions Within Ghana
Even before Stalin's death, as early as 1952 it was
becoming apparent that there was a movement afoot within
the top echelons of Soviet leadership to discard the twocamp thesis.

The departure from the constraints of a

policy that had markedly refused to recognize the movement
toward multipolarity in international relations, was illus
trated by the fact that the Nineteenth Congress of the
Soviet Communist Party, headed by Malenkov (Griulow,
1953), did acknowledge, at least in principle that a non
communist Third World was entitled to follow an indepen
dent ideological path.

This reappraisal was apparently

made with the ultimate goal of exploiting the anti-imperi
alist potential of these countries, more so as anti
colonialism was gaining momentum after the Second World
War.

However, it should be pointed out that such recog

nition did not necessarily mean that the Soviet Union in
the Post Stalinist era was anywhere on the verge of em
bracing any type of nationalist government emerging in
Africa or any part of the Third World for that matter.
What it essentially meant was that the Soviet Union would
at least explore the possibility of wooing these countries
25
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to political neutrality instead of arbitrarily designa
ting them the enemy role in its international dealings.
This was more in keeping with the political realities
which indicated that the element of cold war in Soviet
foreign policy would continue to dominate many externally
oriented policy considerations inspite of growing accept
ance of the theme of 'peaceful coexistence1.

Thus, only

those countries that were seen to be actively anti-wes
tern in their foreign and to some extent domestic policies
would receive Soviet attention.
Given the timing of this appraisal, it was reasonable
to expect the major thrust of its ideological accommodation
to be geared towards countries outside Africa and more es
pecially those of Southeast Asia where independence had
arrived earlier.

Between 1951 when Ghana, then called the

Gold Coast, attained limited self-government to 1960 when
it became a Republic, the conduct of both its foreign and
domestic policies earned only conspicuous indifference,
punctuated by dosages of suspicion and
Moscow.

hostility from

Inorder to put this Soviet attitude within per

spective, it is necessary to examine the internal situa
tion that prevailed in Ghana between 1951 and 1960 when
dramatic changes, more conducive to Soviet economic over
tures, were made.
The first concern of the Soviets centered on the
nature and intentions of the political leadership in Ghana
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and also the manner in which it had come to power.

The

party that ushered Nkrumah to power, the Convention Peo
ples' Party (C.P.P.) was of different orientation from
its intial rival, the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.)
Whereas the C.P.P. was a mass party due to its success in
recruiting from both the educated and the uneducated and
had also superseded the U.G.C.C., in its demand for 'selfgovernment now' the U.G.C.C. had essentially remained a
'country club style' party and had not advocated any mean
ingful political, social and economic change.

But even

with these differences the crux of power within the C.P.P.
lay not in the hands of the so-called 'veranda boys' but
in the hands of a few members who were relatively more edu
cated if not more economically privileged than the common
citizenry.

In contrast, however, the dialectics of Marxism/

Leninism had predetermined a highly important role for the
proletariat as a socio-economic group in the task of colon
ial emancipation.

The ideology rejected as a fallacy the

suggestion that the national bourgeosie which had, rela
tively speaking, received preferential treatment under
colonialism could honestly seek the destruction of a socio
economic system that had served it so well.

It relegated

the task of liberation instead to the proletariat which
had been routinely degraded under colonial rule and there
fore stood to gain more in the event of independence.
another precondition the element of violence was deemed
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essential in any struggle to gain national independence
or effect socialism.

Viewing the experiences of the

Soviet and Chinese revolutions as examples, Soviet theore
ticians envisaged no departure from this prerequisite.
In Ghana that prophecy was not fulfilled as the 1949-50
period indicates.

In his mobilization tactics Nkrumah

cautiously avoided any direct confrontation which might
have provoked the ire of the British.

He chose instead

to use legally permissible tactics such as strikes, boy
cotts and demonstrations to exert pressure on the colonial
government.

Thus because of his painstakingly careful ef

forts, the period preceeding self-government was not only
short but independence itself was won easily.

Apart from

a series of political detentions in which Nkrumah himself
was a victim, together with a handful of shootings (Nkrumah,
1957), no massive scale violence accompanied the campaign
for independence as was to be the case in other countries
such as Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique and
Zimbabwe.
To add on to these conditions already regarded as
unsatisfactory by Soviet leaders, Nkrumah, despite ad
missions of being influenced by the teachings of Marx and
Lenin, showed no preparedness, once in power, to tolerate
even the existence of a Communist Party or lend credence
to any communist cause.

For instance, he had expelled

from his party in 1954, two prominent membersj Anthony
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Woode and Turkson Ocran for having attended a conference
of the World Federation of Trade Unions in the Soviet
section of Vienna.

As it was, the W.F.T.U. had been

established with the aid of the Soviet Union in 1945 for
the purpose of mobilizing workers on an international scale
against Western monopolies exploiting their labour and
resources.

Four years later the western countries countered

with their own trade union movement, the International Con
federation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.).

The Ghana

Trade Union Congress later became a member of the I.C.F.T.U.
Given the choice, Nkrumah would have preferred to keep
his country aloof from the entanglements of the cold war
which he regarded as being inimical to the interests of
small and economically weak states such as Ghana.

He had

on many occasions stated his desire to pursue an indepen
dent foreign policy, which in his words would not be 'com
mitted ideologically or militarily with any particular
power or political bloc'

(Nkrumah, 1961).

But what hap

pened in reality is testimony to the futility of political
independence in the absence of economic power to protect
that independence.

For despite Ghana's efforts not to

appear to favour any particular side in the cold war the
government constantly found it difficult to act against
Western interests.
economics.

The question was clearly that of

The C.P.P. government had to take into account

the overwhelming economic dependence of the country on
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the West; especially on Britain and the United States.
Not only did these two absorb most of the country's ex
ports but they also provided a major source of finance
for development projects.

Moreover Nkrumah wanted to lay

a basis for industrialization and reduce dependence on agri
culture.

To portray his preference for industrial develop

ment over agricultural dependence he had stated his posi
tion thus:
Many countries like the Gold Coast have been too
dependent on agriculture, and in some cases, on
a single crop.
This situation has rendered us
extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in world
prices for our dominant crops.
These fluctua
tions have had unsettling effects on long term
plans and crippled attempts to raise the stan
dard of living.
Inorder to keep up with the
times, it is necessary to develop heavy indus
tries in this country.
The Volta River Project,
for example, is designed for such a purpose
(Nkrumah, 1961).
To Nkrumah the Volta Project might well have been
the lifeline for Ghana's economy.

In his view this project

which would generate vast amounts of electricity, some of
which would be used for smelting the aluminum, was essential
for the country's economic, social and political develop
ment.

Whereas Marxists have always believed in economic

determinism , Nkrumah on his part seemed to regard poli
tical determinism as the basis of power.
motto,

His now famous

'seek ye first the political kingdom and all things

will be added to it', show how much importance he attached
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to political development.

For him the realization of the

Volta Project would safeguard Ghana's political indepen
dence by strengthening its economy, thus reducing depen
dence on any foreign government.

But inorder to make

this possible, sufficient capital would have to be secured
from abroad to help build the dam, smelter and the high
voltage distribution system which would supply electricity
to the big towns and mines in Southern Ghana.
The only open sources of finance for the project at
the time were the western countries with the U.S. viewed
as a major source.

For this reason Ghana could not and

did not seek to alienate potential sources of such valuable
aid either domestically or internationally.

Internally,

most of the institutional structures from the colonial
era were left unchanged even where these at times appeared
to compromise her national sovereignty.

For instance,

even after independence British expatriates in various
capacities continued to occupy the centre-stage in Ghana's
political life.

British interests continued to be repre

sented by the governor-general who in the name of the queen
remained the head of state of 'independent' Ghana.

This

resulted in such political requirements as having to seek
British approval for even some of the basic governmental
chores.

For instance, ambassadors-designate nominated by

their governments to serve in Ghana were technically ac
credited to the court of St. James and as one of Nkrumah's
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former officials points out, even though none of these
appointments were actually reversed, this remained a source
of embarrassment in a country that otherwise took pride
in being a pioneer of anti-colonialism in Africa (Dei-Anang,
1975).

The Constitution itself governing Ghana after 1957

had been worked out not in Accra but in London and the top
echelons of the civil service and the army remained largely
British.
officials

As late as 1959 Ghana still had 21 % of its higher
as foreigners'

and the army only had fourteen

Ghanaians with the rank of captain in its command posts.
The British pound continued to be regarded as a symbol of
monetary stability and the country's external reserves
were k e p t , not in Accra but in L o n d o n .

Nkrumah kept Ghana

within the Commonwealth which boasted among its other mem
berships, that of the Union of South Africa.

Among some

of the reasons he cited for keeping his country within
this organization was his belief that the Commonwealth
was "the only organic world-wide association of peoples
in which race, religion, nationality and culture are all
transcended by a common sense of fellowship" (Nkrumah, 1961,
p. 144).

He allegedly explored ways of establishing diplo

matic ties with an apartheid regime which admittedly would
not have known how to treat a black diplomat
Thompson, 1969).

with dignity

In case there might have been any doubts

about his position, he assured the American media on his
visit to the U.S. in 1958 that communism, as a working
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ideology was doomed in Ghana.

"We in Ghana have no fear.

I might even go further and say that our better institu
tions.

. . do not allow the ideology to have any fruitful

set-up in our country" (Nkrumah, 1961, p. 139).

This then

was the political situation that confronted the Soviet
Union in Ghana between 1957 and 1960.
An account of the political record above, should not
however, be interpreted as an effort to indict the pre-1960
policies.

It should be viewed instead within the context

of the country's fragile economic and political condition.
More importantly it should be viewed against the background
of Soviet ideology, which for its own political reasons,
left no room for sympathy or compromise for countries such
as Ghana which tried to maintain a semblance of economic
stability at independence.

When the leading Soviet Afri

canist of the time, I. Potekhin visited Ghana in 1957, he
was confronted with other issues apart from those already
mentioned, which he thought would be detrimental not only
to the realization of socialism in Ghana but also to the
interests of the Soviet Union.

Among other things, he

came back with the suspicion that some of the high level
C.P.P. officials who were also successful businessmen
were not thinking only of the welfare of the country in
their fervent advocacy of private foreign investment.
Also disappointing to him was the fact that most Ghanaians
remained largely ignorant of the U.S.S.R. as compared to
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their knowledge of western countries.

Like most Afri

cans, the little they heard was either through the ex
patriate civil servants, educators or missionaries and
most of it was negative.

But much more discouraging to

the Soviets was the fact that one of Nkrumah's most trusted
friends and his advisor on foreign affairs was none other
than George Padmore, a staunch adversary of communism and
advocate of Pan-Africanism.

Padmore had left the Comintern

in 1935 in disgust over Stalin's policies toward colonial
Africa.

He castigated the Soviets for treating, black

people as 'revolutionary

expendables'

(Padmore, 1956).

Padmore's hostility toward the Soviet Union was shared
not only by the expatriate community but also by those
Ghanaian civil servants who for one reason or the other
had a morbid fear of communism as exemplified by what one
official allegedly said when he remarked that "The word
'socialism' has some evil connotations so that some people
tend to shiver at the mere mention of it” (Thompson, 1969,
p. 162).

These, worked relentlessly at preventing any

possible contact with the U.S.S.R.
Despite all the conditions prevailing before 1960
Ghana still tried to cultivate an image of non-alignment
and anti-imperialism in the eyes of the world.

One can

only speculate that at this time Nkrumah did not entirely
wish to close the door to the Eastern countries in the
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event that the West tailed to live up to his expectat
ions.

However, events in Africa after 1960 made it

practically unrealistic to pursue ambivalent positions
on matters of foreign policy.

Even prior to 1960 devel

opments such as Guinea's independence were bound to have
an effect on Ghana.

In 1958 Guinea had dramatically re

sisted foreign tutelage when it declared itself indepen
dent of French rule at the risk of economic strangulation.
Instead of accepting the fact of Guinea's independence,
De Gaulle instructed French citizens in Guinea to resort
to destruction of property and also made efforts to iso
late the country diplomatically.

These actions only ser

ved to elevate Toure's image in Africa as a symbol of true
independence; although few states would have ventured to
follow his example.

And while most Western countries

balked at Guinea's request for economic aid because of
fears of antagonizing De Gaulle, the Soviet Union quickly
responded to the pleas of Toure.

Within five months

of independence they had signed a trade agreement with
Guinea.

It is possible that the lesson could not have

been lost on Ghana that Western economic aid was not too
important for the survival of a small poor country.
Before one can clearly understand the change of policy
in the post-1960 era and the fertile ground it was to pro
vide for Soviet economic overtures, it is important to
review to some extent what happened in Ghana in the period
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preceeding that change.

For a decade since the country's

limited self-government, Nkrumah had surrounded himself
with Western economists, the most prominent of who was
Arthur Lewis of Manchester University whose economic ad
vice he had followed throughout the years.

While Nkrumah

authorized a study for the industrialization of Ghana as
early as 1951 his advisors advocated a different strategy.
The Lewis Report suggested instead that Ghana concentrate
on agricultural production and improvement of public ser
vices instead of initiating the establishment of an in
dustrial sector.

The report further recommended that if

any industries were undertaken at all, these would have
to be only in those areas that could operate without ex
tensive subsidization.

Of greater significance was the

fact that it advocated private foreign investment as the
major pillar of industrialization.
In following the recommendations of the Lewis Report,
the government authorized the establishment of the Indus
trial Development Corporation (I.D.C.) whose major task
would be the attraction of foreign investment or the
undertaking of such investment itself in the event of in
sufficient capital inflows from abroad.

A series of in

centives such as cash grants, staff housing, provision
of public services and help in preparing industrial sites
was offered.

The government pledged to compensate foreign

companies in the event of nationalization.

Long tax holi
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days and liberal import regulations were implemented to
entice prospective investors.

In reality however, the

I.D.C. proved itself highly ineffective in the execution
of its duties.

Various reasons have been given for its

ineptitude ranging from shortage of staff to poor mar
keting conditions (Krassowski, 1974).

What is important

here is the fact that the I.D.C. failed in its primary
mission of recruiting private investors to Ghana and the
few enterprises it dabbled in, such as luxury hotels,
laundries and theatres, did little to alleviate the pro
blems of unemployment and balance of payments.

In the

few instances where it delved into manufacturing indus
tries, it only contributed to the stifling of local ini
tiative either by directly taking over local enterprises
or by aiding foreign firms to suppress local competition.
The following passage quoted at large by Fitch and Oppenheimer, from a speech by a C.P.P. benchman perhaps il
lustrates best the imcompetence and the low regard in
which the I.D.C. was held:
The government told us some time ago that the
Industrial Development Corporation was going
to establish a soap factory.
All that the
Corporation did was to buy somebody's soap
factory at Korle Gonno for about L10,000.
Now we learn that a certain engineer is coming
to establish a Llmillion soap factory for the
U.A.C. at Tema.
Are we to allow foreigners
to set up industries which we have the facili
ties to establish ourselves? Whenever we sug
gest that certain industries should be set up
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in the country, some expatriate higher-ups
cleverly turn them down.
They do so on the
ground that the industries would not be
economic,
simply because
they want their
friends overseas
to come
and establish them
(Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966, p. 89).
During the time that Nkrumah followed the Lewis
recommendations, Ghana's balance of payments position
deteriorated drastically.

External reserves which stood

at L113million in 1950 had dropped sharply and no signi
ficant amount of foreign investments was attracted.

In

fact Ghana had

only a meagre L7.0 million invested in her

economy in the

period between

1974).

1951 and 1957 (Krassowski,

Meanwhile the wisdom of concentrating on agricul

tural development as opposed to industrial development
was called into question as cocoa earnings actually showed
a decline later on after production had more than doubled.
For instance, while the 1954-55 period had brought in
earnings of about L85J million at 210,000 tons, such
earnings later on plummetted to L77 million when produc
tion was more than doubled to 590,000 tons.

Nkrumah was

later on to denounce this strategy as just one more way
of furthering the interests of rich nations at the expense
of the poor (Nkrumah, 1965).
Greatly because of the internal economic condition
and partly because of the changing external situation the
C.P.P. government was prepared at this stage to effect
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change in both its domestic and foreign policies.

Since

Nkrumah had always viewed economic development as a major
priority of his government he was at this point prepared
to explore other means of achieving economic development.
The strategy of relying on private capital to provide eco
nomic growth had not been successful and it was thought
either correctly or incorrectly that if the state assumed
a bigger role in the economy through measures such as
directing investment into the country's industrial enter
prises and through Central Planning, much more would be
achieved than was the case with the earlier strategy.
Nkrumah was convinced that if the general level of em
ployment and the national income were to be raised, cer
tain enterprises would have to be controlled not by the
private sector but by the public sector and the profits
accruing

thereof would be used to finance development

and therefore reduce the tax burden on the Ghanaian public.
But inorder for the state to assume a bigger role
in the economy, a strong central government, free to act
decisively on new economic policies, was imperative.
As Nkrumah saw it, the government could least afford at
this particular time,

the luxury of an unfettered, dis

ruptive opposition bloc which could, if left to its own
devices, produce an unstable political atmosphere.

A

way had to be found to enable the C.P.P. to become the
only political party assuming the responsibility of
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political mobilization.

To this effect Nkrumah proposed

to the electorate, a Republican Constitution which would
guarantee the head of state strong presidential powers.
When the election was held in 1960, the majority of voters
supported his proposals by casting 90% of their vote for
the C.P.P.
With a more consolidated position domestically,
Nkrumah confidently set about to re-direct the course of
Ghana's domestic and foreign policies in a manner commen
surate not only with the changing needs of his country,
but also with the changing political climate in Africa
as a whole.
On the domestic front the government for the first
time acknowledged the necessity of adopting an ideology
that could mobilize the masses in support of its programs.
The adoption of the C.P.P. Program for Work

and Happiness

emphasized the desirability of socialism as the only sys
tem through which Ghana could modernize and industrialize
her economy.

The program pointed out to the legacy of

colonialism and imperialism which had left Ghana without
accumulation of capital in private hands; a factor that
had made industrial revolution possible in Western coun
tries.

It lay forth as a major political objective, the

need to effect rapid change in the socio-economic struc
ture of the country by freeing the economy from foreign
control.

As it was, there was a great preponderance of
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foreign domination in sectors such as banking, mining,
construction and manufacturing, with British, American,
Syrian or Lebanese companies exercising greater control
of these sectors.

The program therefore had, as one of

its important targets, bringing under State control the
major means of production, distribution and exchange
(Program of the Convention People's Party for Work and
Happiness, 1962).

Although one must admit that such a

program was bold at b e s t , regarding the structural changes
that would have to be made to implement it, its importance
however lies in the fact that it did at least identify
the problem areas of economic development in a manner not
done before.

It undoubtedly gave political direction to

the Seven Year Development Plan after the Second Plan,
adopted in 1959 was scrapped in 1961.

The Seven Year

Plan or the Third Plan, as it is sometimes called was de
finitely more ambitious than the previous plans in that
it emphasized comprehensive economic planning rather than
partial planning of the past.
What is important here is the fact that at the time
the Third Plan was drafted, the general economic situation
in Ghana had drastically changed.

Whereas at the time of

independence Nkrumah could proudly inform the Legislative
Assembly of the country's financial self-reliance in these
memorable words:
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We are in no way dependent on foreign capital.
The amount of our public debt is very small
and much of our development. . . has been
financed out of our own funds and not, as in
other countries by borrowing. . . . The
material basis for the independence of Ghana
exists.
We can stand on our own feet
(Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, 1957).
The truth of the matter is that by 1961 this was no
longer the case.

Ghana could not stand on its own feet;

it needed either accelerated levels of foreign invest
ment or economic aid if it were to implement most of its
planned projects.

Both the First and the Second Develop

ment Plans had concentrated on encouraging foreign in
vestment but as we have already indicated they had not
met with success.

But their shortcomings were still com

pensated by the fact that budget surpluses from cocoa
sales could still be utilized to close the gap caused by
shortage of private foreign investment.

In 1961 cocoa

exports could no longer provide the pillar of domestic
financing because of the downward trend they were ex
periencing; they had fallen to their lowest since 1947.
Because of the resulting situation the C.P.P. govern
ment was left with two choices; either scaling down its
development efforts with all the political risks that
might entail or seeking economic aid from abroad.
The possibility of having to seek economic aid from
the U.S.S.R. was recognized by Nkrumah as early as 1951.
However, at that time he looked to the Western countries
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for assistance with the realization that this might be
the only way at domestic consolidation.

But still he

managed to hint that even though he was "appealing to
the democracies of Britain and the United States for
assistance in the first place" in the event that such
assistance was not forthcoming, he would be "forced to
turn elsewhere" (Nkrumah, 1957, p. 136).
The constraints that had fettered him from 'turning
elsewhere1 had all but evaporated

by 1960.

For one, the

speed with which he had carried out the Africanization
program had diluted the country1s overwhelming dependence
on British civil servants who had cautioned him against
developing ties with the Soviet bloc.

Their exodus in

1960 enabled him to be more flexible in launching a new
policy toward

the Soviet Union.

that precipitated

Secondly, the

events

the Congo Crisis in 1960 brought his

foreign policy more in harmony with the U.S.S.R. than
with the West.

It will not be necessary at this point

to relate in detail circumstances leading to the Congo
crisis, but it will be sufficient to note that after
Lumumba's assassination Nkrumah felt betrayed by the
United States

and other Western nations who he

thought had

hidden behind

the U.N. flag to carry out their

political

objectives which happened to diverge from his own.

For

quite some time circumstances surrounding the death of
Lumumba were vague.

But recent revelations of C.I.A.
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activities in the Third World have been pointing toward
the possible role the agency might have played in his
demise (Stockwell, 1978).

However, what matters is that

while Nkrumah had favoured an African solution to the
crisis, to keep out the cold war and demonstrate Africa's
ability to solve its own problems, the western countries
perceived direct involvement as the only way of safeguard
ing their economic interests in the Congo.

Most of all

Nkrumah believed that the U.N. forces should have been
used to support the legitimate government of Lumumba where
as the U.S. and her allies viewed Lumumba's victory as
being inimical to their vested interests.

It was there

fore in the aftermath of the Congo crisis that he warned
in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in 1960, of
the danger posed to the organization by what he called
powers who "do not appear to realize the gravity of the
situation and are playing with fire by attempting to
use the United Nations as a cloak for their own aims
(Obeng, 1960, p. 168).
The reaction of the U.S. government to Nkrumah's
U.N. address contributed to a further deterioration in
relations between the two countries.

The U.S. Secretary

of State, Christian Herter in his statement to a Foreign
Press Association meeting mentioned that in as far as
his government was concerned, Nkrumah had "marked himself
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as very definitely leaning toward the Soviet bloc" (New
York Times, September 24, 1960).

This comment is cre

dited with having provided fuel to those in Ghana who
perceived the U.S. as being incapable of appreciating
African aspirations (Thompson, 1967-68).

In contrast

the U.S.S.R. had managed within the three years preceeding the Congo

Crisis to cultivate an

standing toward the newly independent
the political and economic sphere.

image ofunder
countries in both

In those few years

the Soviets had overtaken the U.S. by endorsing the
policy of non-alignment.

The U.S.S.R. also made known

its willingness to extend economic aid to developing
countries.

At the Cairo Conference following the Bandung

Conference of Afro-Asian countries which took place in
1957, this is what the Soviet representative Arzumanya
Arzoumanian told the assembled delegates of the Economic
Commission:
We are ready to help you as brother helps
brother. . . . Tell us what you need,
and we will help you and send to the best
of our capabilities money in the form of
loans or aid. . . . Follow the route you
consider best.
We don't ask you to join
any blocs or change governments or change
your internal or foreign policies (Kimche,
1973, p. 132).
When these words were spoken in 1957, they probably fell
on deaf ears as Ghana was not ready to have any contact
with the Communist bloc.

In fact the Ghanaian delegate
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at the Conference is reported as having denounced Soviet
intervention in Hungary as a form of imperialism (Kimche,
1973).
But by 1960 the pendulum had swung so much that after
he had met with Soviet leader Khrushchev at the U.N.
Nkrumah could afford to say that:
Russia does not want war.
Russia wants peace
more than anything else. . . .
I believe
that until the nations in the West become
a little less fanatical about Communism and
anything that emanates from the Soviets. . .
only then can we look forward to world
peace with any certainty (Obeng, 1960, p. 198).
From this time on those in the C.P.P. who had previously
been regarded as 'radical1 like trade unionists and some
journalists in the propaganda section of the party, did
not have to work hard to influence Nkrumah on the need
to develop ties with the U.S.S.R.

Most important is the

fact that the delicate negotiations with the World Bank,
British and American loans for the Volta Project had been
finalized at this stage.

There was no indication that

any significant amount of investment from the West would
be forthcoming; and

after begging for it for the past

ten years Nkrumah probably concluded that there was no
need to tailor his policies to please the western coun
tries.

Relations with Britain and the U.S. were at

their lowest ebb.

This provided fertile ground for re

ceptivity of economic overtures from the Soviet Union.
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The Purposes of Soviet Aid Diplomacy and
Its Theoretical Tenets
One of the basic questions here is why the Soviet
Union launched its economic aid program as it did and es
pecially at the time it chose to.

Part of the answer lies

in the nature of the international system as it existed
after the Second World War.

One of the effects of the

war was the emergence of the Soviet state as a powerful
global power with more secure borders and an almost com
plete domination of Eastern Europe.

With the passage of

Stalin from the Soviet political scene, his theories of
'socialism in one country1 and 'capitalist encirclement'
were discarded and replaced by the theme of

'peaceful

coexistence* which de-emphasized war, with the particular
exception of national wars of liberation, as an important
instrument of foreign policy.

Khrushchev's conception

of peaceful coexistence consisted of a two-pronged stra
tegy of co-operation in the West and competition in the
Third World.

The Soviets maintained that the advent of

nuclear weapons had drastically changed the nature of
modern warfare and it was in the interests of international
peace that there be co-operation with the West in resolv
ing outstanding political differences so as to reduce the
threat of nuclear war.

But they also proposed on the one

hand that both systems on the opposite sides of the
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ideological spectrum engage in political and economic
competition for the allegiance of the newly independent
countries.

This, the Soviets believed would help deter

mine which should be the dominant world system without
military repercussions.
The collapse of British imperialism in Africa after
World War II and the rise of American power on the one
hand provided ample opportunity for the Soviets to test
their new strategy.

Ghana's colonial master suffered

from severe balance of payments crisis after the war, due
to a loss of markets, reduced levels of productivity and
above all Britain was forced to liquidate her foreign as
sets which were bought by the U.S.

Thus by the time of

Ghana's independence Britain had become the world's lar
gest debtor.

In contrast, the United States, her terri

tory unscathed by the ravages of war had suffered no
production loss; instead her exports had risen to record
high as she was to supply the war-torn economies of Wes
tern Europe and it was not long before international re
serves were concentrated in the U.S.

With the growth in

economic power came the necessity for political power
that would protect the newly acquired economic interests.
As the defender of the 'Free World' she naturally developed
strategic interests in Africa that were derived from the
over-all policy of trying to contain
munism'.

'international com

Africa came to be viewed as a 'link' in the
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ring of alliances designed to contain communism.

The

U.S. was interested in having direct access to African
strategic raw materials and the control of the sea lanes
off the west coast of Africa due to their geographical
proximity to continental U.S.

But as the political cli

mate began to change in Africa in the late fifties the
U.S. urged Europe to decolonize.

But despite this, it

remained generally opposed to what it termed political
'radicalism* in Africa.

U.S. policy makers saw both the

continuation of direct colonial rule and the coming to
power of revolutionary regimes in Africa as a threat to
its global interests.
For the first three years of its independence Ghana
posed no threat to these interests as Nkrumah pursued
policies that were acceptable to the western countries.
But by 1960 his government was regarded as 'revolutionary'
because of the drastic changes in his foreign policy.
The U.S. was more wary of Nkrumah's active involvement
in the internal affairs of Southern Africa and what they
viewed as his 'subversion' of neighboring conservative
states.
The turn of events in Ghana however presented new
opportunities for the Soviet Union.

By now Moscow had

developed her own atomic weapons, had successfully
launched the first space satellite and at this height of
international prestige, was confident to challenge
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American influence abroad.

Despite the theme of

'peace

ful coexistence', a dichotomic image of world politics
remained an essential ingredient of the Soviet world view.
The undertaking of economic aid was well in tune with its
foreign policy toward Africa which was geared toward the
reduction of what it regarded as growing American hegemony
over Africa.

Khrushchev charged the U.S. with threatening

the economic development of poor countries through exploita
tion of their natural resources by U.S. monopolies (Khrush
chev, 1960).

And since the U.S. had already been credited

with financing one of the biggest economic ventures in
Africa, the Volta Project for which Nkrumah had been so
anxious, the U.S.S.R. decided to launch its own aid pro
gram, hoping to dilute any undue influence the U.S. ,might
otherwise wield in Ghana.
But it was not only the threat of American hegemony
that the Soviets had to reckon with.

By 1960 what pre

viously appeared like a monolithic communist bloc was ex
periencing cracks as the Sino-Soviet dispute broke out in
to the open.

Maoist China, herself a former beneficiary

of Soviet aid had by now uncovered numerous differences
with Moscow on matters of ideology that she was prepared
to challenge the Soviet position publicly.

China had al

ways maintained that the Soviet revolution was not a
model for developing countries while " . . .

the road

which the Chinese people chose for victory over imperial
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ism.

. . is the road which the peoples of many colonial

and semi-colonial lands must choose" (Chen Pota, 1951,
p. 96).

What had practically sounded harmless ten years

ago suddenly sounded ominous as the Chinese positioned
themselves for confrontation with Moscow in Africa.

The

Chinese took seriously the efforts of Moscow and Washing
ton to isolate them

diplomatically and while they had

been previously complacent about dealing with the outside
world, in the early sixties they decided to pursue an ag
gressive foreign policy.

Mao Tse Tung had also discovered

how foreign aid could be turned into a useful tool of
foreign policy and as a one time recipient of Soviet aid
himself, he cherished the idea of how China could use the
aid weapon to embarrass the Soviets by offering more at
tractive terms to African countries.

The fact that Ghana

had already extended diplomatic recognition to Peking in
1960, coupled with Mao's invitation of Nkrumah to China
and a promise of an aid package amounting to $19.5 million
(Peoples' Daily, August 22, 1961), compelled the Soviets
to minimize the impact of probable Chinese influence in
Ghana.

Since they were already sensing the threat posed

by China to their position in the Third World, as revealed
by Peking's manouvres at two international conferences
of the W.F.T.U. and the World Peace Council (Legvold,
1970), the Soviets countered the threat by undertaking
a larger aid program than Peking.
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One of the important objectives of Soviet aid was
to influence the economic policies of the Ghanaian govern
ment in a manner that would ultimately work to the advan
tage of the U.S.S.R.
influence.

while minimizing western economic

Ghana was mentioned in Soviet writings as one

of the few countries in Tropical Africa where conditions
for non-capitalist development prevailed.

Ghana was cited

as an example of those African countries where national
industry is largely in government hands and where indus
trialization would therefore have to be undertaken by
government through public financing and controlled build
up of industry (Potekhin, 1961).

While it was accepted

at this time that the specific conditions for socialism
did not exist, it was believed that even the establish
ment of state capitalism was a positive economic develop
ment which should be supported with Soviet aid.
On a different level economic aid was meant to keep
Ghana on a non-aligned course while also increasing the
attractiveness of non-alignment to those African countries
either on the verge of independence or already indepen
dent.

By offering aid to countries like Ghana, Moscow

sought to increase their independence from the West while
also strengthening their bargaining power.

Private

western investments were said to be nothing but the old
form of capital export and the high interest rates charged
on western credits were viewed as a method of keeping
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poor countries in dependency (Solodovnikov, 1961).

Thus

Soviet aid was meant to act as a counterweight to western
aid.

In this regard, the ultimate U.S. decision to finance

the Volta Project despite Kennedy's insistence that " . . .
in the administration of [foreign aid] funds, we should
give great attention and consideration to those nations
who have our view of the world crisis" (Thompson, 1961,
p. 190), could well have resulted from American fear that
the Soviets would offer aid for the project if Washington
reneged on its initial promise.

When a Ghanaian delega

tion led by Kojo Botsio visited Khrushchev in the Crimea
in 1960, he made it clear to the Ghanaians that if the
U.S. delayed over the project, he would build it for them.
Last but not least is the perceived role of aid as
an important tool in the effort to strengthen the Soviet
position in world affairs.

The belief in the eventual

victory of communism over capitalism demands that the
Soviets win the friendship and support of developing coun
tries like Ghana on those international issues that are
of importance to Moscow.

The assertion that it is better

to have a hundred friends than a hundred rubles clearly
underscores the importance attached to gaining support
of developing countries; especially one like Ghana which
was taking a lead in African affairs in the sixties.

Such

support was potentially valuable to Moscow especially with
in international bodies where votes might be extremely im
portant .
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The Scope and Form of Aid Allocated
Basically the U.S.S.R. utilizes the same economic
methods followed by western countries in their economic
dealings with the developing nations, and that is trade,
credit extension and technical assistance.

Unlike the

Chinese the Soviets hardly ever resort to non-repayable
grants in any of their aid programs.

Whenever they do

the percentage of such grants is so small as to be negli
gible.

In the case of Ghana outright gifts consisted of

a personal helicopter to Nkrumah and a $5 million nuclear
reactor which was the first of its type in Africa (Mclane,
1974).

The choice of loans over grants has been goaded

by both political and economic considerations.

Taborsky's

argument that Soviet preference for repayable loans over
outright donations stems from the desire to steer away
recipient countries and make them dependent on the Soviet
bloc while plausible in some case studies such as Cuba
or Afghanistan (Taborsky, 1973), does not exactly apply
in the case of Ghana.

Inorder for dependency the type

of which Taborsky talks about to occur, a massive aid
program has to be undertaken by the donor and in Ghana
the Soviet program was so modest,

$82 million in all,

that it is difficult to believe Moscow expected Ghana
to become dependent on the U.S.S.R. for such a small sum.
It is more realistic to accept the thesis that the Soviets
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preferred loans instead of grants because of the ability
to establish continued contacts; but these were not neces
sarily meant to encourage dependence as such.

If one ac

cepts the logic that Moscow sought to establish permanent
relations with those countries like Ghana, from which she
had been isolated, it would be understandable that aid
on a grant basis would result in contacts of short dura
tion while projects were being implemented whereas a cre
dit based aid program would last through the period of
implementation and repayment which could sometimes last
as long as fifteen years.

On an economic level the pre

ference of repayable loans can be justified on grounds
that the Soviets might find it cheaper in the long run
to offer loans because the original investment would still
be returned even if only partial payment were made.

The

fact that some payments were later made even though Ghana
had to ask Moscow for the rescheduling of some of the
debts, lends credence to this argument.
Trade was one of the most important methods used by
the Soviets to expand their contacts with African coun
tries and other Third World countries.

However, as a

component of aid, trade remained a double edged sword.
While it was admittedly used for political reasons, its
economic advantages were not discounted.

Khrushchev

himself, in pointing out this fact, cautioned developing
countries receiving Soviet aid not to view the U.S.S.R.
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as a charitable institution.

"The Soviet Union gives

aid on fair commercial principles" he noted (Morison,
1964, p. 17).

The danger of accepting the

'political

motivation only' argument lies in the fact that it is
not wholly reflective of Soviet-Ghanaian economic rela
tions.

Subsequent trade relations with Nkrumah*s govern

ment did not indicate that Moscow's policy was that sin
gularly motivated.

Had such been the case, the Soviets

would certainly have relieved Ghana of all its cocoa es 
pecially when it could not be sold on the world market
in times of dismally low prices.
case.

This was not to be the

The Soviet economic unit acted like any other; the

government purchased only enough to satisfy the domestic
market.

Trade was therefore mainly used for satisfaction

of consumer needs.

During the pre-war years for instance,

the U.S.S.R.'s import policy centered around the acquisi
tion of those commodities that could be used for develop
ment of industry and mechanization of agriculture.

How

ever, the Soviet economy later developed different needs
and the focus of trade later moved toward the import of
consumer goods and technology.

Ghana of course lacked

the capability to export the latter but as the world's
largest producer of cocoa at the time, could potentially
cultivate one of its biggest markets in the Soviet Union.
Unlike other forms of economic relations listed in
this section, trade between the Soviet Union and Ghana
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took place years before any diplomatic ties were estab
lished and any aid program initiated.

Because of the

popularity of chocolate in the U.S.S.R., the government
started importing Ghanaian cocoa as early as 1932 and
it is estimated that the level of imports grew from a
modest 300 tons in 1932 to 11,000 tons five years later.
The war years saw an interruption of imports but the Mos
cow Economic Conference of 1952, singled out Ghana as one
of the countries whose markets the Soviets sought to re
enter.

By the time Ghana became independent cocoa ex

ports to the U.S.S.R. had tripled from 12,200 tons in
1956 to 37,000 tons in 1957, a fact that made Ghana a
prime supplier of cocoa to the Soviet Union (Smith, 1973).
The reasons why we have to consider this period at all lies
in the fact that throughout all this time the Soviets were
importing Ghanaian cocoa on a strictly cash basis.

The

basic problem confronting them was the fact that although
Ghana was willing to sell its cocoa, it was apparently
unwilling to buy Soviet products in return.

This was a

general problem encountered not only in Ghana but in other
less developed countries with one-way trade links to the
U.S.S.R.

But whereas efforts were made to change the

situation through measures such as industrial exhibits
and trade fairs as early as 1952, it was not until 1960
that the Soviets were able to effect the same measures
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in Ghana.

The same goes for the decision to abandon the

policy of paying with cash and adoption of barter arrange
ments where the trade partner would import Soviet machines
and equipment while it paid for these in local commodities.
After diplomatic relations were established with Ghana
in 1958 the U.S.S.R. made efforts to penetrate the Ghana
ian market which was biased in favor of western countries
like Britain and the U.S.

The Soviets used trade fairs

with the purpose of demonstrating their economic achieve
ments and exploring export possibilities in Ghana.

They

also resorted to the use of trade delegations and visits
by highly placed officials to promote trade.

The first

trade delegation arrived in Ghana in May, 1959 and it cul
minated in the signing of the first trade agreement in
1960 (United Nations Treaty Series, 1960).

When comple

mented by the 1961 supplementary credit the total for the
aid package came to $82 million.
years Moscow had dispatched

In a space of eight

10 trade delegations (exclu

ding trade union delegations).

Ghana reciprocated with

about 9 of its delegations (McLane, 1974).

The U.S.S.R.

was also able to open its first industrial exhibition in
Accra in September 1960; this was followed by another one
in July 1962.

By 1964 the Soviets were successful in

increasing the level of machine tool deliveries to Ghana
from 3811 (in thousands of rubles), in 1962 to 8730 in
1964 (Muller, 1964).

The Soviets were aware that Ghana
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like most developing countries was enthusiastic about
industrializing its economy, as Nkrumah had reiterated
this desire time and again.

Moscow saw in this an op

portunity to further penetrate the Ghanaian market by of
fering to assist in the implementation of some development
programs; especially after the C.P.P. government had
launched the Seven Year Plan which emphasized central
planning.

From the beginning of this plan Ghana was be

set by the problem of matching available resources against
the desired objectives of the plan.

The failure to estab

lish regular inflows of private capital from abroad and
the low price of cocoa made the role of foreign aid more
critical to the country's development efforts.

To assist

in these efforts the Soviets offered to sell their indus
trial equipment and their technical assistance on medium
and long term credits, allowing payment in local commo
dities.

Credit extension was viewed as an important in

strument through which the U.S.S.R. could familiarize
Ghanaians with the advantages of a socialist mode of pro
duction by introducing into the country Soviet goods and
technology. Moscow was realistic enough to recognize the
fact that as a former western colony, Ghana would be dis
posed to purchasing western products because of familiar
ity with such products.

If this western monopoly on the

Ghanaian market had to be broken, special inducements in
credit extension had to be made.

Allowing Ghana to pay
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low interest rates of 2.5% while also paying for Soviet
goods with her local products held special attraction for
the recipient.

For one the barter arrangements eliminated

the need to use scarce foreign exchange to finance aid
debts and to pay for imports.

This provided a form of

relief to Nkrumah's government whose foreign reserves had
by this time dangerously declined.

Repayment periods were

usually extended over a period of twelve years, thus fol
lowing the general pattern of Soviet credit terms to
developing countries.

Such lenient terms had a potential

for generating good will from the recipient.

One study

points out the vast difference between western and Soviet
loan terms in Ghana by comparing one western economic en
terprise to

one of the admittedly less generous loans

of the U.S.S.R.

This study indicates that even less

generous loans from the Soviet Union such as the

Iliyu

shins and trawlers which required down payments of between
10% - 40 %, payment periods of 5 - 8 years and interest
rates of 4%, still came out favorably when compared to
some western concerns like Parkinson Howard (Ghana)
L t d . , which was involved in the extension of the Tema
Harbour.

In this particular instance Parkinson Howard

demanded a down payment of 60% with a repayment period
of 2.5 years and an interest rate of 5.5% (Stevens, 1974).
It should be noted however that Parkinsons is one of the
more extreme examples of western economic ventures in Ghana.
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The Soviet credit system though relatively generous
was not always favorable to Ghana.

The Soviets usually

have their credits covering only the foreign exchange
costs of projects financed through their aid while they
expect the recipient to bear all local costs.

This is

how one Soviet spokesman explained his government1s
policy:
The governments of these countries [L.D.C.s]
undertake to provide the labour and all the
work to construct the industrial and other
projects with technical assistance of Soviet
specialists.
Financing in local currency
all the expenses connected with the con
struction and other related jobs is an ob
ligation of the country that receives the
credits.
These conditions in granting
Soviet credits permit them to be directed
into purchases of essential equipment and
materials for a maximum number of projects
(Kapranov, 1962, p. 49).
This policy which was at best alien to the Ghanaian
government which was used to dealing with western govern
ments which usually financed part of the local costs, did
pose problems at times.

Apart from slowing down the rate

of project implementation,

it posed problems in donor-re

cipient relations by making extra demands on the resources
of the recipient.

For example, in the contract concern

ing the Tema fish processing complex, Soviet credits
only covered the cost of design work and the supply of
equipment and any extra expenses accruing in the venture

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

62

were supposed to be borne by Ghana.

The supply of 32

Soviet experts (five of these were interpreters and
did not have to be paid by Ghana) ultimately cost Ghana
L30,656.

In another venture the Ghanaian government

found itself having to foot the bill for the salaries
and expenses of Soviet agricultural specialists who had
been sent to inspect possible sites for pilot schemes to
produce rice and cotton.

Even though these specialists

received relatively modest salaries, this still posed an
extra burden on the C.P.P. government.

Because of this,

Nkrumah was prompted to write to Khrushchev complaining
about the arrangement while pointing out that most western
personnel working in Ghana had their salaries normally
paid for by their own governments.

This resulted in a

compromise wherein Moscow ended up paying half the salaries,
the full cost of insurance and baggage transport (Stevens,
1974).
Even though this paper does not concern itself with
any project by project analysis, it is equally important
to shed some light on the other aspect of Soviet credit
policy regarding the type of projects that were funded
in Ghana.

Even though the Soviets emphasize the impor

tance of heavy industry, it is apparent that they do not
as a matter of policy extend aid for projects they be 
lieve are beyond the technical capabilities of their
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recipients.

The level of development in each country

is deemed important in the kind of projects Moscow will
finance.

They have therefore at times advised develop

ing countries like Ghana which have small populations
and narrow home markets to build factories either for
production of consumer goods and processing of raw ma t 
erials; they also advised on the, need to develop agri
cultural production.

The State farms program; for in

stance was one of the projects they undertook between
1962 and 1965.

At this time Ghana was adopting an agri

cultural development strategy which stressed diversifi
cation of production.

The aim was to increase domestic

production enough to reduce imports and to reduce food
prices.

The corollary strategy for all this was mechani

zation; that is the use of mechanical
would increase labor productivity.

implements which

The U.S.S.R. agreed

to help organize state farms in the protocol signed be
tween her and Ghana in December, 1960.

Four locations,

Adidome, Afife, Branam and Zongo Macheri were picked by
Soviet specialists for the production of rice, maize and
cotton.

In conjunction with the state farms the Soviets

helped establish three farm mechanization schools which
would teach the use of modern agricultural equipment such
as hydraulic equipment and pumps (Uphoff, 1970).

Other

projects consisted of a fishing complex with a capacity
to process 25,000 tons of fish per annum, a gold refinery
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and a prefabricated-ferro-concrete panel factory.

The

Soviets also supplied aid for mineral exploration and
geological mapping between 1962 and 1966.

Overall they

undertook to finance about 20 projects despite the fact
that the original list first submitted by Ghana included
such projects as an iron and steel works, a 400 mile rail
road, a sewage system and an assortment of other indus
tries.

This indicates that the U.S.S.R. will not indis

criminately fund huge industrial projects that cannot be
supported by the recipient.

While it was prepared to

fund a massive project such as the Bhilai Steel mill in
India because the base for advanced industrial enterprise
already existed there, it was not prepared to apply the
same criterion for Ghana.
This section would be incomplete without the mention
of military aid and technical assistance.

If Soviet

military aid of about $10 million - $15 million appears
modest, it is not because Moscow was unwilling to extend
larger amounts; it is rather a reflection of the modest
needs of the recipient.

Unlike other Soviet recipients

of huge arms supplies e.g. India, Egypt and Syria, Ghana
had no geopolitical motivation for a large military build
up.

For their own part the Soviets extended military

aid to keep Ghana out of any military alliance with the
western countries either by providing bases or joining
military blocs.

The Soviets also offered military training
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to Ghana and this culminated in the dispatching of about
100 Ghanaian officers to the U.S.S.R.

immediately follow

ing Nkrumah's state visit to the Soviet Union.

Soviet

military personnel, estimated at 1,000 in 1966 (New York
Times, March 3, 1968) were also active in Ghana either
as members of the Presidential Guard, teachers at the
Ideological Institute at Winneba or participating in the
guerilla training centres which had been established in
1961 for freedom fighters from Southern Africa.

The Soviets

allegedly terminated their participation in guerilla train
ing in 1962 (Legvold, 1970).
Apart from sending in their own specialists to Ghana
to supervise their projects and for training-on-the job,
the Soviets also extended technical assistance by way of
educational scholarships which enabled Ghanaians to study
in the U.S.S.R.

Although there is no breakdown of figures

here, these were in fields like medicine, agriculture,
engineering and liberal arts.

It is believed that by

1965 Ghana had the largest number of African technical
trainees in the Soviet bloc and about 815 liberal arts
students in the U.S.S.R.

(U.S. Department of State,

RSB-10, January 25, 1967).

This form of technical as

sistance therefore complemented credit extension and
trade as important components of Soviet aid to Ghana.
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CHAPTER III
LIMITATIONS AFFECTING LEVEL
OF EFFECTIVENESS
After reviewing the nature and extent of Soviet aid
accorded Ghana in the seven years or so of Nkrumah's
rule, the question of paramount importance is the effec
tiveness of such aid in attaining the political objec
tives of the donor.

The paper seeks to establish to what

extent Soviet foreign policy met its objectives in Ghana
despite the Soviet loss of influence with the demise of
Nkrumah.

The paper will examine if Soviet goals were

aided or impeded by internal and external factors in the
Ghanaian polity which were beyond Soviet control.
It is suggested here that the answer to the first
question is two-fold.

Moscow's political record in Ghana

was a mixture of both success and failure.

On the posi

tive side the Soviets were successful in keeping Ghana
away from joining any military pacts or providing mili
tary bases for the western nations.

This was a signi

ficant gain because Western economic aid had been used
in some countries like Nigeria, and recently in Somalia
and Kenya to win such concessions.

Even though Ghana

still depended on Britain for military training of its
officers, it refrained from joining pacts.

After
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endorsing the policy of non-alignment, the Soviets could
also view with satisfaction the attainment of their goal
of making non-alignment a viable option for Nkrumah whose
total economic dependence on the West in the 1951-60
period drastically limited his choices in the pursuit of
his foreign policy.

Before the extension of Soviet aid

to Ghana, Nkrumah's foreign policy was literally hostage
to his need of developmental funds from the U.S. and
Britain and while he entertained the hope of receiving
such funds, he pursued an unbalanced 'non-alignment*
policy which heavily favored the western
against the Soviet bloc.

countries

It was only after finalizing

the plans for the Volta Project and convincing himself
that no further aid would be forthcoming from the West,
that Nkrumah, fortified by Soviet economic help, was able
to take bold measures in his foreign policy.

For the

first time, he was able to tailor Ghana's policies in a
manner that could fit
ternational issues.

his personal beliefs on most in
For instance, while he had been am

bivalent on the Algerian war before, he could now side
with the nationalist forces openly regardless of the sensi
bilities of the French government.

Efforts to accommodate

South Africa were abandoned as he moved closer to the lib
eration movements of Southern Africa, which hehelped train
in Ghana, with Soviet aid.

When the white minority govern

ment in Salisbury unilaterally declared independence in
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1965 not only was Nkrumah able to denounce the act but
he was able to break diplomatic relations with Britain,
an action not possible a few years ago.
Khrushchev maintained that the anti-Communist moti
vation for U.S. and western economic assistance was so
pervasive that the countries of the Third World should
give the Soviet Union credit for whatever western aid
they receive:
This aid which the capitalist countries are”*2"
planning to extend to the states which have
recently won their independence should also
be viewed as a particular kind of Soviet aid
to these states.
If the Soviet Union did not
exist, is it likely that the monopolies of the
imperialist powers would aid the underdeveloped
countries? Of course not.
This has never hap
pened in the past (Rimalov, 1960, p. 45).
To some this

statement might seem too bold a claim but

one cannot deny that the Soviets could claim credit for
having strengthened Ghana's bargaining position with the
United States.

By providing an alternative source of

aid, the Soviets enhanced their recipient's bargaining
position with the traditional providers of such aid.

In

the case of the Volta project it is clear that Soviet
offers of aid prompted the hesitant Kennedy Administra
tion to go through with the project even though U.S.
policy makers were generally dissatisfied with Nkrumah's
foreign policy.

In this regard the Soviets were success

ful in their aim to strengthen Nkrumah's position in. his
dealings with the West.
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The strategy of using aid to win support of the
recipient in matters of international importance to the
Soviet Union also seems to have worked well in Ghana.
While some analysts have voiced surprise at Nkrumahs' sup
port of Soviet positions even on matters that are of no
interest to Ghana (Thompson, 1969), the point should be
made here that Nkrumah*s sympathy with the Soviets on a
wide range of issues was equally the result of his dis
satisfaction with U.S. policies much as it was of Soviet
aid.

The Soviet Union came to be viewed as a supporter

of African aspirations within international bodies such
as the U.N. greatly because Moscow sided with African
countries on matters of anticolonialism and racial domi
nation.

U.S. African policy which saw communism as the

ultimate winner in any revolution came to view Africa as
a problem of containment.

Because of its central theme,

this policy essentially identified itself with proponents
of political, economic, social and racial repression.

For

instance, in 1960 when the General Assembly voted on the
first major Afro-Asian resolution against colonialism,
the United States abstained with the European colonial
powers.

The support given to Portugal through NATO, a

factor criticized by Nkrumah (Emerson, 1967) and the use
of U.S. troops (which ended up fighting side by side with
South African and Rhodesian mercenaries) in the Congo, un 
der the pretext of pre-empting the Soviet threat, all
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combined to push Ghana into the Soviet camp.

The Soviets,

on their side consistently and unconditionally denounced
colonialism and racial oppression and voted with African
countries on these matters.

This had the effect of con

vincing Nkrumah that where African interests are concerned,
the Soviet Union could be relied on.

He, in return ended

up supporting Mascow even in those issues that Ghana had
no stake in, and with the knowledge that Soviet aid was
available in the event of western punitive measures, he
had no difficulty in exercising this newly won freedom.
By 1963, one study indicated that Ghana was the

'fifteenth

friendliest state* to the Soviet Union (Teune & Synnestvedt,
1965).

When one excludes the countries of Eastern Europe

that usually vote with the Soviet Union in any case, this
revealed a high degree of co-operation indeed.

Ghana

showed its sympathy and support to Moscow on issues rang
ing from Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban Crisis to
"appreciation of the Soviet position on the settlement of
the West Berlin issue" (Ghana, 1961, p. 4.).

Within the

United Nations Ghana seemed to vote more in accord with
Moscow than with Washington.

David Kay's study which

covers the 1960-68 period indicates that Ghana voted with
the U.S.S.R. 24 times while it only did so with the U.S.
4 times (Kay, 1970).

Ghana's support was exhibited on

issues involving Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
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On the domestic front, Soviet economic aid could
also be attributed to some changes that worked to Moscow's
advantage.

The creation of a state trading agency in

Ghana such as the Ghana National Trading Corporation
(G.N.T.C.) to facilitate economic relations with the
U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries is the type of ef
fect the Soviets desire to generate through aid and trade
with developing countries.

This ties in well with the

strategy of enhancing the state sector which the Soviets
believe is the only means of achieving economic growth
independent from foreign or more specifically, western
influence.

Prior to the establishment of the G.N.T.C.,

foreign trade was largely in the hands of expatriate com
panies but in 1961 when extensive import and exchange
controls were introduced, a large foreign importing and
distribution firm called Leventis, was taken over by the
government and renamed the Ghana National Trading Corporation.
One of the major gains of Soviet aid was the adoption
of

'scientific socialism' by the Ghanaian government.

though Nkrumah had wanted to adopt socialism as a state
ideology for some time before the advent of Soviet aid,
it is apparent that after his pilgrimage to the Soviet
Union in 1961 there was a drastic change in economic
thinking.

As the government statistician, E.N. Omaboe

indicates, Ghanaian officials, impressed by the process
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of economic planning in the Soviet Union, came home to
replace the Five-Year Plan with a new Seven Year Plan
based more on socialist principles (Omaboe, 1966).

Apart

from promulgating a new plan the government took other
measures to realize socialist objectives.

The establishment

of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba which
offered two year courses to civil servants, trade union
and C.P.P. officials on Marxism/Leninism, was effected
with Soviet help.

Nkrumah for the first time criticized

the heterogeneous social composition of the C.P.P. noting
philosophically that "we cannot build socialism without
socialists" (Nkrumah, 1961, p. 12).

In an attempt to

strengthen the position of those more ideologically re
ceptive, he allowed supportive groups within the C.P.P.
such as the Trade Union Council (T.U.C.), United Ghana
Farmers' Council (U.G.F.C.) and the National Association
of Socialist Students Organizations (N.A.S.S.O.), to as
sume a more active role in the country's politics.

These

groups went on the offensive, advocating more socialist
measures such as the establishment of state industries
and they also attacked corruption vigorously, making the
C.P.P. old guard their major target.
visers had for a long time counselled

Soviet economic ad
Nkrumah to dismiss

some of his blatantly corrupt officials but to no avail.
Thus the final expulsion of figures such as K. Gbedemah,
Botsio and Welbeck attests to the advantages they were
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gaining.

Also at this time, party relations between the

C.P.S.U. and the C.P.P. were consolidated as exemplified
by increasing contact between the two.

For instance,

in October, 1961 representatives of the C.P.P. were in
vited to address the 22nd C.P.S.U. Congress.
Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

Also the

later on invited a

C.P.P. delegation to the U.S.S.R. to acquaint its mem
bers with the training of ideological workers.

Perhaps

more remarkable was the decision in 1963 to allow a Ghana
ian delegation to spend part of its study time at the
Soviet Higher Party School, a privilege usually accorded
to communist states only.
Perhaps the visibility of Soviet influence in Ghana
was symbolized more by the entrusting of President Nkrumah's
own personal safety to Soviet security forces.

When

Nkrumah was initially offered such help he had declined.
But after two assassination attempts he had finally asked
the Soviets for consultants for his private security force.
Although Khrushchev was later to voice his dissatisfaction
with his remark "What could a few men do?

Nkrumah's body

guards could not guarantee the stability of the State,
especially when the army was in the hands of Englishmen,"
(Khrushchev, 1974, p. 335), the mere fact that it was to
the Soviet Union that Nkrumah turned when he felt per
sonally threatened illustrates a development of great
trust, that was absent in the period before the extension
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of economic aid to Ghana.

It was now the U.S. which ap

parently was at a disadvantage, having clearly failed to
win Nkrumah's confidence and with the C.I.A. being sus
pected of plotting against his life, relations between
the two countries, left much to be desired.

At the same

time the Soviet ambassador Rodionov, was reportedly be
coming the most influential diplomat in Accra.

Rodio

nov's great influence has been reported by such wellknown analysts as Robert Legvold and Scott Thompson.
However, Michael Dei-Anang, one of Nkrumah's former of
ficials categorically denies this, pointing out that U.S.
ambassador William Mahoney also enjoyed great influence
in Accra.

It was only when Washington sent Franklyn

Williams, whom Nkrumah suspected of C.I.A. ties that re
lations deteriorated (Dei-Anang, 1975).
any

At any rate,

undue influence on the part of the Soviets clearly

worked against the interests of the U.S. and its western
allies.
Despite all these gains which must seem quite spec
tacular when measured against the size of Soviet aid one
cannot remain oblivious to the fact that the potential
effects of aid, trade and technical assistance were greatly
limited by processes either within or outside of Ghana
which the Soviets seemed unable to control.

The Soviet

Union had not accomplished all it had set out to achieve
in Ghana.

For instance, even though there had been an
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increase in the level of trade between the two countries.
Moscow failed to influence Ghana's trade relations with
the western countries.

It is estimated that Ghana's

total trade with the Soviet bloc came to only 15% as late
as 1964, despite the fact that the U.S.S.R. had become
the biggest importer of Ghana's cocoa (Sawyer, 1966).
The preponderance of western economic influence in Ghana
potentially limited the extent to which the Soviets could
hope to control events in the country.

On another level,

Soviet aid failed to affect economic policy in Accra, due
to divergence of views in the development strategies de
sired by both sides.

While Soviet economic advisors cau

tioned against excessive reliance on suppliers' credits
for the country's industrialization efforts, the C.P.P.
government on its side encouraged their widespread use
because of Nkrumah's conviction that this would ultimately
aid in the process of economic decolonization.

While some

symbolic gestures were made by the government in addressing
the problem of corruption, the Soviets were dismayed by
Nkrumah's inability to undertake measures drastic enough
to deal with the problem.

Most of those dismissed were

back in office within a short time.
Perhaps the greatest failure of all, attesting to
the inadequacy of Soviet economic aid to maintain its
political momentum was the final collapse of Nkrumah's
regime in 1966; a factor that threatened to wipe out
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overnight all the political gains that had been made to
date.

The army-led National Liberation Council (N.L.C.)

that wrested power from the C.P.P. government, was un
equivocally anti-Soviet in its outlook.

While it active

ly sought to realign Ghana with the West by selling off
profitable state industries to foreign businessmen and
inviting western technical assistance in the form of
I.M.F. specialists and the Harvard Advisory Group, it
called for the suspension of Soviet financed

projects

and expulsion of diplomats and techical experts from
Ghana.

This act alone, revealed for the first time the

fragility of aid as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy
in Africa.
In the following pages an attempt is made to elucidate
those factors that operated internally and externally to
limit the effectiveness of Soviet assistance.

Internal Variables
Bureaucratic Attitudes Toward Socialism
and its Programs
Although Communist ideology emphasizes the central
role of a proletariat in any socialist revolution, Soviet
theoreticians under Khrushchev,

in a move to cultivate

some Third World countries mitigated their stand in re
gard with this ideological prerequisite.

It was claimed

by some Soviet analysts like Mirsky that the socialist
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revolution need no longer be spearheaded by the pro
letariat as such but any element close to the working
class.

It was suggested that the national bourgeousie

could undertake this task (Mirsky, 1964).

The rea

soning behind this reassessment was that in those
developing countries where an industrial proletariat
is either non-existent or negligible,

it would take

years to wait for the formation of this economic
class that could only be brought about by capitalism.
It was believed that these countries could avoid the
lengthy process by relying on socialist countries
like the Soviet Union either on a political or econo
mic level.

Ghana was one of those countries given

ideological legitimacy which endorsed its ability to
set foot on a road to socialism regardless of its
level of development.
The ideological accommodation however did not
concern itself with the finer details of how social
ism would actually be implemented.

It merely based

its hope on the nature of the political leadership,
which because of its 'progressive' outlook and will
ingness to co-operate with the Soviet Union would
somehow introduce socialism from above.

Nothing was

said about the preparedness or ability of the
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the bureaucratic elite, which in this context in
cludes the civil servants and C.P.P. officials, to
play a constructive role in G h a n a 1s economic develop
ment .
Though one can hardly downgrade the importance
of financing projects in the implementation of any
development plan, it is simply not enough to mobilize
only economic resources while ignoring political re
sources.

Maintaining the support of those groups

whose compliance is necessary in carrying out econo
mic policies of the regime becomes as crucial as the
very task of augmenting the government's development
funds.

In dealing with countries like Ghana, the

Soviet Union has emphasized, as part of its economic
aid, technical and educational assistance because
of the realization that shortages of technical skill,
trained administrative and managerial personnel
could seriously impede the implementation of all
Soviet aid commitments.

The U.S.S.R. also believes

that such efforts would also help "deprive the im
perialists of important levers of spiritual influence
on liberated countries and for the dissemination of
reactionary, anti-socialist ideas"

(Kommunist, 1964,

p. 31).
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At this juncture there is no need to belabour the
point that Soviet aid conspicuously lost the battle
against what Moscow termed reactionary, anti-socialist
ideas in Ghana.

Our main interest lies in trying to ex

plain the failure to permeate the thinking of those whose
co-operation was essential in making possible the socialist
experiment as desired by the U.S.S.R.

In this regard,

the most crucial groups tended to encompass the civil ser
vants, the C.P.P. officials and army officers.

Given the

excessive amount of resources they received from the
state by way of salaries and other benefits and also taking
into account their burgeoning numbers brought about by
Nkrumah's accelerated program of Africanization, all these
groups proved in the final analysis to be strategically
important in either aiding or impeding the process of
change demanded by the Seven Year Development Plan.

It

is argued here that the political and social values of
the bureaucratic elite that Nkrumah had to rely on in
the Post-1960 era did not provide a good foundation for
carrying out the political goals of the C.P.P. government
and these values finally rendered futile Soviet efforts
at promoting socialism in Ghana.
In one of the more inward looking accounts of what
really happened in Ghana in the period preceding the 1966
coup, this is what one prominent official of Nkrumah's
government had to say,

"Cocoa and the Civil Service have
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always seemed to me to lie at the root of Ghana's pro
blems" (Bing, 1968, p. 388).

This statement, when evalu

ated against the political background against which Nkrumah's programs were undertaken, correctly diagnoses part
of the malaise that was to plague Soviet-sponsored pro
grams in Ghana.

At the time of Ghana's independence

Nkrumah inherited a civil service apparatus that was a
colonial creation and thereby operated through the guide
lines that governed colonial bureaucracies everywhere.
Ghanaian civil servants like their counterparts everywhere
in Africa were psychologically programmed to believe that
they could implement the code of bureaucratic neutrality
in the exercise of their duties.

The same myth applied

to the notion of a non-political army where Ghanaian
soldiers were taught to 'remain above politics' whatever
that might mean.

Both the theories of bureaucratic neu

trality and a non-political army were invented to safe
guard British interests as they were based on the pre
mise that an army or a civil service that questioned
policies of the colonial government might be tempted to
question the whole process of colonialism itself.

What

happened in actual life is that most of the recruits in
to the civil service and the army already had set poli
tical beliefs, acquired through years of training in
British oriented educational institutions.
top

Most of the

civil servants and high party officials either ,
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received their education in Britain or in British-run
institutions in Africa.

The British connection in Ghana

introduced liberal values rather than radical ones as
was the case in neighboring Francophone Africa.

British

universities at which most of the Ghanaian civil servants
studied were liberal only in political orientation while
they were actually conservative and elitist in tone.

Thus

one finds that the Ghanaian bureaucracy even in the post
independence era was shaped by its conservative objectives
which happened to run parallel to Nkrumah's socialist aims
of effecting social and economic change.

As a group, this

bureaucratic elite was more articulate than other sectors
of the Ghanaian population like peasants and workers.
They had no cause to support any measures, especially radi
cal ones, that might be aimed at equitable redistribution
of the country's resources.

Since they regarded them

selves as local heirs to the British legacy either in the
civil service or the army they had never really accepted
the socialist tenets that Nkrumah advocated.

Their main

objective was to control the system and fill those posts
formerly controlled by British civil servants and other
professionals.

When Nkrumah decided to change the direc

tion of Ghana's development policy, he did not dismantle
this machinery but adopted it intact to pursue a develop
ment plan, the political criteria of which the Ghanaian
bureaucratic/military elite did not believe in.
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independence had been won and Ghanaization of the civil
service was underway very few bureaucrats believed in the
necessity of a second revolution.

To most the scramble

for office space, big cars, government provided housing
and service privileges were the only reasons for having
achieved independence in the first place.
How then, one may ask could government officials
with such an outlook be expected to impartially carry out
their duties to promote socialism funded with Soviet econ
omic resources?

The answer lies in the fact that both

government and party officials ultimately welcomed Soviet
economic aid when they realized that no structural changes
were necessary for its utilization.

The man who was to

memorably sum up the general attitude of Ghanaian bureau
crats and C.P.P. officials was none other than Krobo
Edusei, one of Nkrumah's cabinet ministers, who seemed
to be speaking for the majority of Ghana's bureaucrats
when he remarked,

"Socialism is a system in which if you

have a lot of money you can still keep it" (Le Vine, 1975,
p. 1).

It was perhaps the manner in which this money

was actually acquired that put to ridicule any pretensions
to socialist commitments.

As Stevens indicates,

"the peo

ple drawn into the public sector were not necessarily
socialists in the Soviet sense of the term.

Neither were

many of those whose task it was to effect the revolution
from above" (Stevens, 1976, p. 133).

It had suddenly
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dawned on many of these individuals that state enter
prises could still be a lucrative method of accumulating
personal wealth.

As one Ghanaian novelist observed, men

who knew nothing about politics suddenly grew hot with
ideology, thinking of all the money that would come (Armah,
1968).
One will notice that in the Soviet Union import sub
stitution had been an important goal of development stra
tegy as the Soviets imported capital goods, technicians,
blue prints and prototypes in exchange for traditional
exports.

The aim was to use this imported capital to con

struct industries whose output would replace the imports.
This strategy was successful as signified by the fact that
although imports of machinery and equipment had increased
from 917.6 million rubles in 1929 to 1,354.6 million rub
les in 1932, by 1937 the Soviets had been able to cut down
the level of such imports to 242.8 million (Wilber, 1969).
It was believed then that because of the success of the
Soviet model, developing countries like Ghana whose econo
mies were overburdened by the high cost of imported goods
could follow the Soviet example.

Inorder to curb the

high level of imports the Ghanaian government introduced
tight import controls and high import duties and taxes
on consumers goods.

An elaborate licensing system was

undertaken by the state to clamp down on the skyrocketing
import bill which in 1964 had items such as food, fuel,
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components and raw materials claiming about 44% of the
total bill (Krassowski, 1974).

A state corporation, the

Ghana National Trading Corporation which was established
to co-ordinate trade links with the Soviet Union was also
charged with the task of regulating the flow and prices
of imported goods on the local markets.

However,

in 1965

it became a focus of investigation, together with the
State Farms Corporation and the Ghana National Construc
tion Corporation.

The Abraham Commission charged with

investigating the whole system of wholesale and retail
trade in Ghana came to the conclusion that import license
procedures and underproduction were the major causes of
shortages and high prices.

The Commission brought under

scrutiny the whole commodity distribution system of the
G.N.T.C.

Although the Commission's Report was censored

before publication, its expurgated version was able to
reveal that a number of officials in the G.N.T.C., the
Ministry of Trade, G.N.C.C. and the State Fisheries Cor
poration were involved in corrupt practices that could
not help the success of the organizations they represen
ted (Le Vine, 1975).
On another level the Ghanaian civil servants re
vealed their anti-development sentiments in various ways;
either by making excuses for inadequate performance or
by foot dragging when they were ill-disposed to any in
dividual project.

One of the typical grievances of these

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

85

bureaucrats against Nkrumah's development plan was por
trayed more succinctly by Omaboe when he admonished the
government,
In Ghana, the politicians are always ahead
of the civil servants and the planners in
the general consideration and implementa
tion of economic and social projects. . . .
The ideal would be either for the politi
cians to refer these matters to the techni
cians for study before a commitment is en
tered into or for the technicians to move
with the politicians and be in a position
to provide them with alternatives from
which they should make their choice. . .
(Omaboe, 1966, pp. 460-61).
The truth of the matter is that even though there is
some validity in the argument of closer consultation, the
'non-political' Ghanaian technicians did have distinct
political backgrounds and no one could guarantee their
'objective co-operation'
them as Omaboe suggests.

if all matters were referred to
Many personalities in the civil

service were formerly opposed to the C.P.P. and its plat
form and their biases could not be expected to disappear
overnight because they were now employed by a C.P.P. led
government.

There were instances of anti-Soviet pre

judice which could be detected among some highly placed
officials.

For instance, the Chief architect of the Seven

Year Plan and a senior member of the State Planning Com
mission himself in an article appearing in the Economic
Bulletin of Ghana, voiced his convictions about how ir
relevant Marxism was to Ghana (Mensah, 1965).

On another
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occasion when a suggestion was made to block imports of
U.S. and Canadian flour in favor of Soviet supplies be
cause of Ghana's favorable balance of trade with the
Soviet Union, one of the principal secretaries on the
Committee for Economic Co-operation with Eastern Countries,
suggested the proposal be ignored because it would upset
established trade relations with North America (Thompson,
1969).

The lack of co-operation from civil servants at

times led to Nkrumah dispensing with their advice as signi
fied by an incident cited by Uphoff where Ghana's bureau
cratic representative in Moscow, made the decision on his
own about the unsuitability of the equipment he was being
offered.

In this instance he was ordered to sign the

order, regardless of his opinions (Uphoff, 1970).
Thus in an atmosphere of distrust it became difficult
to ascertain even the legitimate complaints bureaucrats
might have had against Soviet projects.

For instance,

the Soviet Geological Survey Team sent to Ghana between
1962 and 1966 did not enjoy the most cordial of relations
with the Geological Survey Department of the University
of Ghana and yet the two sides were expected to work to
gether.

Ghanaians complained about everything from in

efficiency of Soviet vehicles, which they claimed con
sumed too much fuel, to the fact that reports were not
detailed enough and that Soviet technicians spent too
much time in Tamale and other towns instead of working
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in the bush (Uphoff, 1970).

Despite their complaints

these individuals however submitted a favorable report
to the government when Nkrumah was allegedly prepared to
cancel the project if it was unduly expensive.

The re

sult was that the project continued, only to be abruptly
terminated by the coup and Soviet experts left their re
ports, instruments and maps behind when they were ordered
out of the country.

There were other similar instances

which cannot be mentioned here where Soviet-Ghanaian re
lations were plagued by ill-will and this in effect re
duced the level of effectiveness of Soviet economic aid
to Nkrumah1s regime.
Ghana's Chronic Economic Problems
One of the major factors that finally contributed
to a weakened impact of Soviet aid is the monocultural
nature of Ghana's economy.

The term 'monoculture' is

used to describe a country's overdependence on one or more
cash crops.

In the case of Ghana this crop was cocoa,

leading to the now familiar saying that

'the politics of

cocoa is the politics of Ghana and the politics of Ghana
is the politics of cocoa".

The price crises of 1964-65

and 1971-72 both led to political instability and both
resulted in military coups.

Ironically, it was the truth

of this statement that was to undo Nkrumah's socialist
experiment and deny the Soviet Union any sense of
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permanence in its political gains.

The irony of the matter

is that Nkrumah1s economic objectives had always been moti
vated by the desire to reduce his country's dependence on
cocoa; hence his obsession for laying an industrial foun
dation for Ghana.
Inorder for one to appreciate the crucial role that
cocoa ultimately played in the economic and political life
of Ghana one has to understand the origins of its dominance
over the economy.

Before the advent of British colonial

ism, Ghana's economy like others in Africa, was not monocultural because of the need to satisfy internal demands
as opposed to external demands.

But the success of the

industrial revolution in England brought with it new de
mands for an international division of labor, which es
sentially relegated to newly acquired colonies the role
of providers of raw materials for the colonial power.
The non-industrial nature of Ghana and of other colonial
countries was therefore a deliberate imperial policy aimed
at stopping the transference of machinery and skills which
would have given competition to European industry during
the colonial era.

To a great extent the economic history

of Ghana was to prove the validity of Lenin's theory of
imperialism as presented in his work, Imperialism, The
Highest Stage of Capitalism, in that it lends credence
to most of his arguments as regards the nature of im
perialism.

For instance, he had argued that a characteristic
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of the use of colonies for raw materials was the cartel
ization of raw material buyers in the late nineteenth
century.

One of the aims of these buyers was to capture

raw material sources with the ultimate intention of dom
inating both the actual producers and the manufacturers
of capitalist Europe (Lenin, 1969).

Ghana's cocoa export

trade was later to mark the emergence of the sort of car
telization that Lenin had warned against.

Extreme car

telization of the buying of cocoa and efforts by organ
ized buyers such as Gill and Duffus, General Cocoa and
J. H. Rayner to obtain power over distribution by control
ling the commodity markets in London and New York, were
combined with further attempts to take over or include
into the cartelized system companies that specialized in
manufacturing of cocoa products.

These three, together

with A. C. Israel and Continent control among themselves
over 75% of world cocoa trade (Kofi, 1975). Because of
their huge financial resources buyers such as Gill and
Duffus were able to monopolize market information on
crucial factors such as estimates on demand and supply.
This in turn led to their virtual monopoly on price
determination.
Just as Lenin had postulated that one of the func
tions of the colonies was the provision of super-profits
for the capitalist world, these corporations used their
monopoly on cocoa trade to accumulate huge profits.
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meant in essence that despite an export-oriented economy,
no surplus was utilized within Ghana because it was ex
ported out by metropolitan export and import firms.

For

instance, the largest exporter in Ghana, the United Africa
Company, was also the largest importer.

This actually

meant that the United Africa Company (U.A.C.) and other
European firms controlled not only cocoa prices but also
the price of essential, imported goods like clothing and
tools.

During the Second World War for example, these

firms paid only L10 per ton for Ghana's cocoa beans as
compared to L50 per ton before the war, while at the same
time they trebled the price of imported goods.

This had

a net effect of encouraging more Ghanaians to produce
cash crops like cocoa, thus making Ghana more dependent
on the exchange economy.

Ghanaians found out that in-

order to buy essential goods they needed to have cash and
this they could acquire only through growing cocoa.

But

as they diverted their attention to cocoa production for
the European m a r k e t , they started to import goods which
they had previously been able to produce on their own
such as cloth, sugar, salt, pots and containers.
However, the country's preoccupation with cocoa pro
duction only contributed to the vulnerability of the econo
my to external forces due to lack of control over cocoa
prices.

The Ghanaian farmer, left at the mercy of Euro

pean buyers was forced to sell his produce at any price
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determined by these companies.

In their response against

this practice, these farmers decided to have a 'cocoa
hold up' in 1937 wherein they refused to sell their cocoa
until prices were raised.

But as Rodney illustrates, in

one of the best works explaining the frailty of African
economies, the cocoa hold up and the subsequent solution
adopted to remedy the farmers' complaints, had no impact.
According to Rodney's account, although Britain agreed to
set the Cocoa Marketing Board (C.M.B.) which would buy
directly from farmers instead of big firms like U.A.C.
and Cadbury, the board's operations turned out to be
nothing but a smoke screen.

For example, while the C.M.B.

was supposed to pay the Ghanaian farmer a reasonable
price; this covered a stable price even if world prices
were to fall, in practice the C.M.B. paid low fixed prices
even in times of rising world prices (Rodney, 1974).

Also

the big firms like the U.A.C. and John Holt continued to
act as intermediaries in the buying and selling of cocoa;
only this time their profits were made more secure by the
fact that they could hide behind the government shield
in the form of the Cocoa Board.

The Chairman of the

Cocoa Board within the Ministry of Food was none other
than John Cadbury, the director of Cadbury's Brothers
engaged in cocoa trade.

Under his direction the Cocoa

Board sold Ghanaian cocoa to the Ministry of Food at
very low prices.

In return, the Ministry sold to British
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and American manufacturers at high prices and the profits
thus earned provided valuable foreign exchange for Bri
tain.

The repatriation of cocoa profits to Britain meant

that the multiplier-effect took place only in Britain
while the source of the profits, the Ghanaian economy,
was deprived of possibilities of dynamic growth.

It is

estimated that as late as 1955 the British government was
holding as much as $210 million derived from the sales of
cocoa and minerals from Ghana (Rodney, 1974).
This background is necessary for two reasons.

The

first one lies in the fact that it gives an accurate de
piction of the economic environment in which Soviet as
sistance was to operate in the post-1960 period.

It is

also important because of the basic assumption we make
about the role of Soviet aid in any development effort of
the recipient country.

This assumption presupposes that

Soviet economic aid only complements the internal econo
mic resources of the recipient and cannot and does not in
tend to act as their substitute.

One of the major ob

jectives of this aid was to help Ghana wrest control of
its economy from foreign domination of western monopolies
such as Gill and Duffus.

The launching of the Seven Year

Plan marked an effort by Nkrumah to augment government
control over the economy with the ultimate goal of re
ducing western influence.

One of the methods applied to

attain this goal, a method enthusiastically sanctioned by
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Moscow, was the diversification of trade partners.

It

was believed by both sides that the expansion of trade
links with the Warsaw Pact Countries would alleviate
pressure from Ghana's economy whose overwhelming depen
dence on cocoa made it especially vulnerable to outside
forces.
But was the re-routing of Ghana's trade or at least
part of it toward the Soviet bloc an effective remedy
for the country's economic problems?

More important did

it enhance the Soviet Union's political strategy of con
tributing to Ghana's economic independence?

There is no

doubt that in as far as Ghana was concerned, the expansion
of trade with the U.S.S.R. especially as regards cocoa
sales was beneficial because of an increase in its earn
ings.

Data

on

Table

(1.1) indicate

the level of

Ghanaian exports of cocoa to the U.S.S.R. up to the time
of the coup; if anything this table illustrates that in
as far as the Ghanaian goal of increasing cocoa revenues
through diversification of trade partners, was concerned,
there was an element of success.

But as the table indi

cates there was a significant failure in the strategy to
balance Ghana's trading partners.

The problem of trade

and economic dependence on a few western countries like
the U.S. and Britain remained largely unsolved by in
creased cocoa purchases of the Soviet Union.

It would

seem that Ghana should have tried to develop her trade
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TABLE 1.1

Average Unit of Ghanaian Cocoa Exports
to the U.S.S.R.

(3)
Quantity
Exported
to other
Consumers

(4)
Total
Value of
Exports
to U.S.S.R.

(5)
Total Value
Exports
to all other
Consumers

Year

(2)
Quantity
Exported
to
U.S.S.R.

1960

34

269

14,544

116,256

1961

19

387

6,174

132,450

1962

25

398

8,680

125,366

1963

43

361

14,130

121,4 06

1964

33

349

11,946

124,530

1965

66

428

21,593

114,883

1966

55

336

17,241

85,816

275

2,528

94,308

820,707

(1)

Total

Notes:

(2) and (3) denominated in thousand long tons.
(4) and (5) denominated in thousand new cedis.

Sources:

Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic
Survey 1962; Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics,
External Trade Statistics of Ghana, Vol. XX,
no. 12 (Accra, Dec. 1970).

I
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

95

and economic relations with the U.S.S.R. and other bloc
countries in such a way as to reduce as much, and as
quickly as possible, her dependence on traditional, wes
tern partners.

Such a reorientation was necessary if the

problem of economic fragility was to be resolved.

The

amount of trade with the U.S.S.R. was highly insufficient
to free Ghana from its trade dependence on the West as
Table 1.1 shows.

It is also indicated on this table that

Soviet imports of Ghanaian cocoa varied greatly from one
year to another e.g. while trade value only amounted to
6,174 cedis in 1961, it reached its peak in 1965 by rising
to 21,593

cedis, only to fall down to 17,241 a year later.

This irregularity and the relatively smaller quantities
purchased,

illustrates the failure to reduce dependence on

western countries.
The major obstacle remained the inability to diversify
Ghanaian exports while cocoa remained the biggest earner
of foreign exchange; about 60%.

The problem of diversi

fication, seen by some as more of a political problem as
Fitch and Oppenheimer assert, remained fundamentally im
portant to Ghana's economic well-being.

Whether or not

as Fitch and Oppenheimer argue, diversification could
have been attained through a social revolution that would
ensure the adoption of large-scale farming, central plan
ning and domestic production of agricultural capital goods
(Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966), the reality of the situation
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made for a vicious circle type of performance.

The fact

that planning was undertaken with the price of cocoa as
an undetermined factor, threw a spanner in the work of
those who had to make budgetary allocations for projects.
In times of high cocoa prices, this was not a problem,
but whenever there was a fall in price, the whole process
of planning was thrown into disarray.

The drawing of the

Seven Year Plan did not however take into account such un 
certainties and when problems arose, adhoc measures such
as the austerity budget of 1961 with all their accompany
ing political risks, were adopted.

Though the government

apparently had good intentions in its economic policies,
it seems to have lacked a clear-cut policy of self-sup
porting development.

It also seems to have assigned too

big a role to foreign assistance, including Soviet as
sistance.

Of the LI,000 million capital expenditure ex

pected, no less than 40% was to come from foreign sources
(Fitch & Oppenheimer, 1966).

When economic prospects

seemed to darken as signified by mounting debts, the
C.P.P. government did not reduce expenditure accordingly.
For Soviet aid to have had any great impact on a
situation that was becoming more gloomy by the day, Mos
cow would have had to supply more loans and absorb more
Ghanaian exports and at more favorable prices than the
West.

Despite the 1958 Cairo Conference to offer aid in

unlimited quantities and without strings to any developing
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country requesting it, the U.S.S.R. seemed reluctant,
especially after the fall of Khrushchev to commit its
resources to Ghana like it was doing with the other
countries such as Afghanistan,
and even Guinea.

India, Algeria, U.A.R.

It has been suggested by others that

at the time, the generous offers were made with the in
tention of gaining goodwill without the benefit of ex
amining Ghanaian proposed projects (Krassowski, 1974).
But after a while the Soviets paid more attention to the
usual concerns of any donor, like economic viability of
projects, as they had never done before.

On those oc

casions where they felt a project was not economically or
technically feasible they either modified it or rejected
it outright as they did with the plans for a textile mill
which was finally financed by French suppliers.
The continuing dependence on imports which had to be
financed through foreign borrowing and the unstable price
of cocoa, which plummetted to its lowest in 1964/65 by
going below L100, contributed to a series of deficits.
Whether fairly or unfairly the Soviets were criticized
by some Ghanaians for being as exploitative as the wes
tern countries by using the same pricing system as wes
tern consumers (Ghanaian Times, 1965).

At times they

were even accused of stockpiling on cocoa beans to take
advantage of depressed prices on the world market.

The

question of whether such criticism was justified or pot
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is really a matter of opinion.

For example, when the

price of cocoa fell below L100 in 1965, the Soviets
agreed to buy about 150,000 tons over two years and
agreed to increase their annual consumption to 118,000
tons by 1970.

In this particular instance, they offered

to pay more than the prevailing world market price} i.e.
L172 per ton and there is no doubt that at the time this
seemed beneficial more to Ghana than to the U.S.S.R.

But

when the world price later rose, they were criticized for
not re-negotiating a new price.

No matter how one looks

at it though the fact remains that at the time the ar
rangement was made, it did provide temporary relief to
Ghana.
However, what became more important than agreeing to
buy Ghanaian cocoa at subsidized prices was the Soviet
response to Nkrumah's pleas for more massive aid, to res
cue the economy when foreign reserves deteriorated at an
alarming rate.

At this time Nkrumah sought help from the

Soviet Union and from Western countries like the U.S.,
West Germany, Britain and also from the I.M.F. and the
World Bank.

While all the western countries, including

the latter two agencies, denied him financial relief on
grounds that he had jeopardized his country's economy
by shifting a great amount of trade toward the Soviet
bloc, the Soviets were equally unprepared to extend
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assistance of the nature and amount he requested.

Their

response to Foreign Minister Botsio's requests in 1965,
illustrates their lack of commitment to N k r u m a h ’s politi
cal survival.

While they agreed to buy more cocoa at sub

sidized prices and extend a debt moratorium, they cate
gorically refused to part with hard currency as requested
to halt the downward slide of the Ghanaian economy.

It

would appear that by now, they felt that Ghana's economic
problems, could not be solved through more injections of
Soviet aid.

The responsibility was put squarely on the

government's shoulders to follow more sound economic poli
cies like concentrating on improving the productive capa
city of the public sector rather than expansion of social
services, for instance.

At the same time though, the

decision not to commit larger economic resources, did
in fact, limit the political advantages the Soviets might
have gained had they decided otherwise.
External Variables
Economic and Cultural

Dependence on the West

Factors emanating from within Ghana's socio-economic
system as those discussed in the last section, were not
the only obstacles lying in the way of Soviet potential
influence.

There were other restrictions which even

though operating internally, originated from without and
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hindered ultimate Soviet political goals.

In their zest

to cultivate new allies in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially
after their difficulties in the Middle East concerning
Egypt and Iraq, and complications in Guinea where the
Soviet ambassador was expelled, the Soviets seem to have
under-estimated the level of western influence in Ghana
or if they were aware of i t , seemed unprepared or un
willing to meet that challenge.
Any lending country, whatever the nature of its ideo
logy will have a vital concern with the economic policies
of the recipient.

In this particular case the Soviets'

main preoccupation was that the recipient's policies be
geared toward moving the country to a non-capitalist path
of development which would reduce the power of the pri
vate sector while strengthening the public sector.

But

for state control to have any meaning it should be ex
tended over the means of production, which means in turn
that an industrial base is essential for the success of
socialism.

It is what is socialized that is important

rather than just the act of socializing itself.

As

Kulski once pointed out, "Total socialization of all the
means of production even if these means happen to be
cattle or horses,

is not imaginative" (Kulski, 1968, p. 396).

Perhaps Nkrumah was aware of this basic fact in his advo
cacy of industrialization for Ghana which he believed
would prevent the situation which had rendered the economy
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extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the world price
of cocoa.

After all even the Russia of 1914 was not a

completely agricultural country; the October Revolution
enjoyed the existence of an industrial base even though
this was dwarfed by later accomplishments of the Stalin
ists.

Theoretically there was a convergence of views

between Nkrumah and the Soviets on the necessity of in
dustrialization in a socialist economy.

There was also

agreement on the role of capitalism in the underdevelop
ment of the economies of the formerly colonized countries.
It was believed that colonial powers deliberately promoted
non-development and on those few occasions where invest
ments were made, this was done with the purpose of pro
tecting the monopolistic interests of the capitalist
countries.

In Ghana this situation is illustrated by the

fact that western

investment

went chiefly into the exploi

tation of natural resources like gold and the profits ac
cruing there of, were repatriated.

For instance, the

largest mining company in Ghana, the Ashanti Goldfields,
had dividends varying between 75 % and 95% in the 1930-38
period (Stock Exchange Yearbook, 1939).

The technological

limitations of Ghanaian prospectors left fields such as
diamond and manganese mining virtually in the hands of
British mining companies who were usually not interested
in reinvesting their profits in Ghana (Howard, 1978).
Wherever investment was made, it was not in income-generating
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projects but rather in laying down an infrastructure that
actually facilitated further exploitation of the country's
resources.

Thus Ghana already had a public sector that

controlled railroads, utilities and harbors as early as
1919 when the Guggisberg Ten Year Plan allocated L24 million
to provide the country with a modern infrastructure.

But

the function of the infrastructure was to provide trans
portation facilities for the expatriate mining companies
and import-export firms to conduct their business more ef
ficiently (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966).
What Nkrumah apparently wanted was the reversal of
this situation and the development of the industrial sec
tor that would increase the country's productive capabili
ties and finally ensure a fair distribution of resources.
Although he had warned during the implementation of the
First Development Plan that ". . .a democratic Ghana
should not develop a propensity for the consumption of
foreign capital, except what is absolutely necessary"
(Nkrumah, 1961, p. 53), by 1961 Ghana was on its way to
being a consumer of foreign capital.

Economic aid from

traditional western sources such as Britain and the U.S.
could not be relied on as far as governmental relations
were concerned.

For instance after independence Britain

stopped extending grants and while it continued to offer
aid, this was on a highly reduced scale and was not in
tended for industrial development.

It was in the form
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of technical assistance and went into areas like education
and public services.

The same can be said about U.S.

aid which incidentally, had been offered even before in
dependence.

This aid was directed mainly at agricultural

development and therefore focused on areas such as agri
cultural education, extension and community development
projects.

The U.S. government was opposed to extending

any economic aid for development of industry in Ghana.
The Volta Project was to remain the sole exception.

Over

all the position of the U.S. government was that any
Ghanaian efforts at industrialization would have to be
left to private capital as Washington was unwilling to
support any public industrial enterprises.
This only left Nkrumah with three choices; either
to accept the U.S. position and industrialize on suppliers1
credits, seek such funds from the Soviet Union or shelve
the plans for industrialization.

Since his sense of com

mitment for the need to industrialize was so deep, his
choices were in fact narrowed to two.

The Soviet Union

was approached with requests for economic assistance for
several projects.

Among these we can single out the

following; an iron and steel works, a 400 mile railway
line from Kumasi to Ouagadongou in Upper Volta, a poly
technic and agricultural college with an enrollment
capacity of about 5,000 students each, eight brick and
tile factories, a sewage system for the towns of Tamale,
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Kumasi, Takoradi and Cape Coast.

Proposals for five hun

dred other industries were submitted (Stevens, 1976).
What was Moscow's response to all of these Ghanaian re
quests?

Any degree of familiarity with the aid policies

of the U.S.S.R. can enable one to predict their response
to a great extent.

As we already pointed out in Chapter II,

one of the pre-requisites for extension of their aid was
the requirement that it not only fit the recipient's level
of development but also that the recipient also be able to
pay for the local costs of the projects undertaken.

Thus

a country like Ghana was advised to concentrate on agri
cultural production and some factories that would produce
consumer goods and process raw materials for export.

For

a country with a small population and therefore a small
home market like Ghana; Soviet economists usually dis
couraged large industrial projects which they felt the
recipient would be unable to support.

Such considerations,

did not, on the otherhand inhibit western sources of fin
ance especially if they were extending suppliers' credits
to governments of developing countries (West Afri c a , 1969).
Suppliers' credits are short-term loans i.e. repayable
before the project for which they have been negotiated
is able to generate income.

They are granted by commer

cial firms for the export of their goods but are guaran
teed against debtors' default by the government of the
exporting company.

The terms for these loans usually
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stipulate between 5% - 6% interest with principal re
payable in 5 - 8 years.

Most of the studies conducted

on the impact of suppliers' credits on the economies of
their recipients have systematically revealed their un
suitability as a method of financing development projects.
The providers of these credits are usually the party that
benefits rather than the recipient.

One study dealing

with the matter revealed that the monopoly position created
by the supplier means that the actual design of a project,
including the costing is greatly under his control.

This

has the effect of paying no attention to alternative techni
ques of production or other sources of raw materials.

Often,

projects which should employ a relatively large proportion
of labor to capital or a great many local raw materials
are therefore likely to be established with capital in
tensive techniques and a large proportion of imported
goods and materials (Kilby, 1969).

This means in essence

that the development impact on employment and income is
greatly reduced while the foreign exchange outcome in the
borrowing country gets worse.
Yet this is exactly the manner of financing that the
Ghanaian government undertook to carry out its development
projects.

Ironically, Nkrumah thought this financial

strategy would help achieve economic independence for
Ghana in the long run.

The rationale behind this was

the belief that with the credits to develop the productive
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capacity of the economy, the need for dependence on im
ports would be reduced.

Another motivation for suppliers'

credits was Nkrumah's own concern about the political side
effects of economic aid.

He was suspicious of aid given

on very favorable terms and thought that those who offer
generous terms might be hoping to obtain some political
influence in exchange for hard cash.

It is not clear if

the Soviet Union was by any chance one of those suspected
of such intentions.

At any rate he felt that capital

which had been given on hard commercial terms would re
duce the danger of political interference in the affairs
of Ghana (Uphoff, 1970).

While this could have been a

good political strategy, it was not good economics as
the country's national debt climbed precipitously once
this form of financing was resorted to.

Most of these

credits were supplied by Britain and the United States;
together with some West European countries like France
and West Germany.

At the time of the coup the total pe r 

centage of suppliers' credits on the country's list of
liabilities stood at an awesome 71.9% as Table 1

indi

cates.
Britain remained the single biggest creditor on
account of suppliers' credits for Ghana.

The United

States also enjoyed a big share of the market and notably
financed the biggest project of all, the Volta River Pro
ject through these credits.

The relationship between
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TABLE 1
Ghana's Foreign Exchange Liabilities

End
of
Year

.......... .Total.
Liabilities

Liabilities
of
Supp 1 iers'
Credits

Percentage
of
Total

1963

38,372

n.a.

1964

346,786

288,276

82.4

1965

378,363

301,010

79.5

1966

395,337

283,583

71.9

Source:

Ghana Government, Economic Survey, 1969 (AccraTema, 1970).
The amount is calculated in New
Cedi, which was worth approximately one U.S.
dollar at the time.

western private firms and their home governments is bet
ter understood when one analyzes what one company official,
involved in the Volta Project said when he remarked,

"Where

else would we get a 120,000 ton aluminum smelter, costing
$150,000,000 of which 85% was supported by debts, 90% of
that covered by the American government?" (Thompson, 1969,
p. 190).
What did all this mean to the U.S.S.R. regarding the
desired impact of its own aid program?

In as far as the

providers of suppliers' credits were uninhibited by con
siderations of economic viability of their projects,
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because of coverage of export insurance, it meant that
the net effect of Soviet aid would be greatly reduced
because of the distortion of Ghana's development plans
which emphasized socialist principles.

These private

firms, motivated by profit-making and enjoying the pro
tection of their home governments, would invest in pro
jects which did not benefit the borrowing country, and
with the element of risk eliminated they took every op
portunity to do just that.

Thus some of the projects

that Soviet economic advisers discouraged would naturally
be financed through suppliers' credits by western firms
e.g. France provided credits for a textile mill which the
U.S.S.R. would not finance.

The widespread use of such

credits also strengthened Ghana's economic dependence on
the Western countries from which she borrowed and this
would ultimately work against Soviet interests.
On a different level one also has to take into ac
count the motivation of Ghanaian officials who advocated
the use of these credits.

By the nature of their opera

tional method i.e. the link between the initiation of
projects and company profits, these credits left much
room for corruption.

Although Soviet aid terms were

more generous than suppliers' credits which by itself
should have caused the government to actively seek more
of this aid, most Ghanaian officials seem to have been
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more interested in suppliers' credits than in Soviet
aid.

The main reason apart from the question of incom

petence, seems to have been the potential for personal
aggrandizement offered by such credits; a quality lacking
in Soviet aid.

The behavior of Ghanaian officials in

this matter seems to give credence to what is generally
regarded as unpatriotic tendencies by 'dependency theor
ists' who question the role of the bourgeousie in the
economic development of their countries (Ake, 1978).

This

approach has always regarded African businessmen as being
tied to international capital because of the need to im
port supplies from abroad and sell some of their goods
to foreign firms.

To the Ghanaian bourgeosie,

(the term

denotes that stratum made of politicians, senior civil
servants, businessmen, etc.) which lacked a strong material
base, state power apparently seemed to provide the major
and easiest access to substantial capital and suppliers'
credits provided some of the most lucrative venues.

Trans

national companies operating in Ghana were aware of these
weaknesses and took full advantage of them.

The bribing

of some Ghanaian officials usually facilitated the award
ing of contracts that were sometimes economically unsound
or highly inflated (Schatz, 1969).

The success of the

Transnational companies to practice bribery even in high
ly developed countries such as Holland and Japan make it
especially difficult for officials of poor countries like
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Ghana to resist the blandishments of these companies
(Markovitz, 1977).

However the abuse of financial power

by the transnational companies should not detract us
from examining the role of Ghanaian officials in the
economic demise of their country.

One of the miscalcul

ations of the C.P.P. government was the continuing impor
tance it attached to the private sector even as it re
vealed intentions to steer the country onto the socialist
path.

Despite talk of socialism Nkrumah's government

created new institutions like the small-loan section of
the Industrial Development Corporation which would support
the expansion of indigenous business.

Numerous contracts

were awarded to Ghanaians under the auspices of the I.D.C.
These business groups turned out to be among the most
vocal in their criticism of government economic policies
such as tax and compulsory savings schemes.

The govern

ment did adopt certain measures to clamp down on local
businessmen as when it tightened exchange controls, im
port licensing and even threw some of the businessmen
into prison under the Preventative Detention Act.

But

all these actions were ultimately self-defeating as
Nkrumah established agencies like Capital Investment
Board and the Ghana National Investment Bank which ac
tively sought long-term financing from western sources
of capital (Markovitz, 1977).

Thus despite occasional

attacks on private business, no meaninful change was made;
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Ghanaian businessmen continued to purchase and resell at
exorbitant prices basic food stuffs like salt and fish
thus prompting an element of cynicism from others, signi
fied by what one member of the opposition Owusu when he
complained th a t :
Half-starved people are being daily admonished
to tighten their belts, when members of the
new Ghanaian aristocracy and their hangerson, who tell them to do this, are fast developin pot bellies and paunches. . .
(LeVine,
1975, p. 1).
In some instances the government worked against its own
political goals by inadvertently giving some of its aid
to some of the industries.

For instance, the diamond and

timber industries in the co-operative sector continued to
conduct their business as usual even though they were now
aided in their activities by government technical assis
tance and mutual co-operation between themselves (Marko
vitz, 1977).
Over all the use of suppliers' credits seem to have
had a highly negative impact on the Ghanaian economy, to
the detriment of Soviet interests, by tying up large pro
portions of current and future foreign exchange earnings
in the repayment of short-term debts.

Ghana became so

much indebted to her western creditors that not only
could she not pay her debts to the Soviet Union, but
when Moscow refused to give out hard currency to help
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pay for these debts, the country sunk deeper into a depen
dent relationship with the West.

By the end of his re

gime not only was Nkrumah hosting huge foreign investment
from both the United States and Britain but he was also
considering possibilities of associate membership in the
E.E.C., a move unsatisfactory to the Soviets.

He had in

creased the power of pro-west economists within the govern
ment and virtually accepted all the conditions under which
the I.M.F. and the World Bank would give Ghana their sup
port.

By 1967 U.S. investment in Ghana was estimated at

$170 million (Smith, 1974).
On the last note the effectiveness of Soviet aid
was handicapped by other factors that had more to do with
western cultural influence in Ghana than anything else.
The development of cultural and military relations seem
to have been affected greatly as the post-coup period
was to indicate.

Although Ghana had the largest number

of technical trainees from Africa in the Soviet bloc by
1965 and the third largest number of liberal arts stu
dents, the western countries still held a virtual mono
poly on the educating of Ghanaians.

Those who studied

abroad went to Britain or the U.S. in greater numbers
than those who went to the Warsaw Pact countries.

For

those who remained to study in Ghana, the educational
system was still heavily dominated by expatriate faculty
staff members from Britain, especially at the university
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level.

In the final analysis, the Soviet Union was dis

advantaged by the fact that its cultural contact with
Ghanaians was so recent and appeared so alien to those
who were by now well inculcated with western cultural
values that even the presence of Soviet teachers in
Ghanaian schools or the extension of educational scholar
ships for Ghanaians to study in the U.S.S.R., hardly posed
any threat to western cultural influence.
set what was acceptable by way of

The West still

'academic standards'

even in a country proclaiming a new ideology of socialism.
External examiners were still flown from Britain to certi
fy that Ghanaian graduates maintain these standards.

The

effect of this informal control and its negative impact
on Soviet aid was exhibited by the N.L.C.'s policy of re
fusing Soviet trained Ghanaian doctors licenses

under the

pretext that their training was inferior to their Ghanaian
counterparts who were trained in the W e s t .

These graduates

had to submit to re-examination before being licensed
(Legvold, 1970).

In the area of military aid the Soviets

encountered problems of more or less the same magnitude.
While they were able to extend $10 million in small arms
and sent some Ghanaians to the U.S.S.R. to undergo mili
tary training, Britain still remained the most dominant
source of military training for Ghana's officer corps.
It was this group more than any other, if one has to be
lieve the words of Afrifa, which felt duty-bound to remain
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a vigilant sentinel against any threat to western cultural
values especially in military affairs.
soldiers were taught to be

Although Ghanaian

'non-political* during the

colonial era, it was Afrifa a graduate of Sandhurst who
later, explaining the reason for the coup, confessed his
admiration for the British way of life which he felt
Nkrumah was jeopardizing by dismissing certain generals
and threatening the process of 'democracy' in general.
Afrifa accused Nkrumah of having sold Ghana to the Soviets
(Afrifa, 1966).

Ironically Afrifa died at the hands of

the young officers who staged the 1979 coup.

He, like

Acheampong were charged with flagrant corruption.

When

Nkrumah sought Soviet military aid for his personal secur
ity forces, Ghanaian army officers resented this action
which they regarded as interference in the execution of
their basic military duties.

These security forces, armed

in part with Soviet arms and assisted by Soviet advisors
had grown to 50 officers and 1,142 men by 1966 (First,
1970).

Ghanaian soldiers were also alarmed by the fact

that Nkrumah was considering the idea of a peoples' mili
tia which they thought would usurp their own power.
idea itself was not of Soviet origin.

The

It was suggested

by Chinese military advisors who were not popular anyway
(Thompson, 1969).

It was the police and army officers

trained by Britain and with close links with British
security forces that finally toppled Nkrumah and drove
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out Soviet diplomats and technicians from Ghana.

How

ever, news of the coup was accompanied by massive offers
of aid, hitherto lacking, from western countries and the
I.M.F.

The price of cocoa suddenly went up.

All this

but buried any hope of the Soviet Union to influence any
more events in Ghana through use of economic aid.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute
In a conversation with the French Premier, Daladier,
Khrushchev was once asked if the Soviet Union was worried
about the
question:

'Yellow P e r i l 1.

This is how he answered the

"We do not discriminate among people according

to the colour of their skin.

The only distinction that

matters to us is the class distinction" (Khrushchev, 1974,
p. 291).

Khrushchev has since died but even well after

his death the Soviet Union had continued to assert that
it was not the yellow peril threatening Moscow, but the
policies pursued by Mao.

In Ghana like in other parts

of Africa the Soviets were to increasingly face the brunt
of those policies in a manner that interferred with their
own policy aims.
A brief synopsis of Chinese policy goals is in order
here to fully understand their role in limiting the effec
tiveness of Soviet aid.

In the first instance it is im

portant to appreciate the fact that the coming to power
of a Communist regime in the China of 1949 was not a
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result of Soviet assistance but more the determination
of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) and the genius
of its leadership.

In fact Moscow had advised the C.C.P.

to co-operate with the Kuomintang so as to avoid another
civil war.

This advice was given in the light of what

Stalin considered to be vital Soviet interests in the Far
East.

From this time onwards it was clear that the in

terests of a strong United China would conflict both mat
erially and ideologically with those of the Soviet Union.
However, for the first ten years or so of the Sino-Soviet
Alliance the differences that did crop up, were kept with
in a manageable radius as Peking attended to more pres
sing problems like domestic consolidation, the Korean
War, the Sino-Indian tensions and the Vietnam war.

But

with the security threat on her borders reduced and deteri
oration of relations with Moscow on the otherhand, China
seemed determined to use the instrument of economic aid
to compete with the U.S.S.R. in Africa, especially after
the Soviets withdrew their aid personnel from China in
1960 (Scalapino, 1964).

The motivations for Chinese

economic aid in Ghana centered on four basic factors;
winning diplomatic support on general international issues,
embarrassing the Soviet Union in her aid efforts, keeping
Ghana non-aligned in the Sino-Soviet dispute, if not in
fluencing her to take a Pro-Peking stand and finally to
stimulate trade between the two countries.
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Although Chou-En-Lai sent a message of congratula
tions to Nkrumah on Ghana's 1st anniversary of indepen
dence, in which he commended Ghanaians for "consolidating
national independence and safeguarding State sovereignty"
(New China News Agenc y , 1958, p. 9).

Nkrumah had systemat

ically refused to grant diplomatic recognition to Peking.
This was done inspite of the fact that Ghana had voted in
support of the resolution to discuss the China question
at the United Nations in 1957.

It was only in 1960 when

the political climate in Africa changed that Ghana extended
diplomatic recognition to China (Copper, 1976).

This by

itself gave the Chinese a late start in the aid business,
compared to the Soviets.

But it seems they used every

opportunity they could get to their advantage.
Before I proceed,

it should be made clear though

that the main threat from China was not to be found in
the amount of aid given to Ghana as such.

Here there is

absolutely no doubt that the U.S.S.R.'s more abundant
resources dwarfed Chinese efforts by any standards.
China's initial aid package, estimated at $19.5 million
(People's D a i l y , 1961) was supplemented by further credits
which brought the total amount to $42 million by 1966
(U.S. Department of Sta t e , 1976).

This was rather modest

when compared to Moscow's high figure of $82 million.
The main threat of Chinese aid therefore did not lie so
much in its quantity but rather in the manner in which
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it was offered.

The terms of Chinese aid were more

generous than those of the U.S.S.R. and had the effect
of embarrassing the Soviet Union.

Whereas the Soviets

charged Ghana interest rates of 2 - 3 % on their loans,
China extended interest-free loans such as the initial
aid package of $19.5 million given to Nkrumah after his
visit to Peking.

This was done in spite of the fact that

China is a poor country which even though relatively bet
ter off than most African countries is still afflicted
by problems of poverty that the U.S.S.R. does not have
such as malnutrition and a low gross national product.
United Nations statistics indicate that China falls into
the lower one-third of the world nations in terms of the
usual standards used to measure economic development
(World Bank A t las, 1969).

The Chinese economy has been

beset by problems in its industrial and agricultural sec
tors.

Failure in agricultural development has meant for

example that China has had to import grain from western
countries such as the U.S. and Canada to supplement
domestic production which seemed unable to keep up with
the country's population growth.

Yet despite all these

economic hardships, the Chinese government initiated
several projects in Ghana ranging from freshwater fish
eries, handicraft industries, rice paddies, cotton tex
tile and knitwear factories (Peking Rev i e w , 1962).
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China's strategy was to undercut Soviet influence
by emphasizing those differences between Chinese and
Soviet aid that put the Soviets in a bad light.

They

even sought to turn into advantage the modest nature of
their aid by stating that unlike Soviet aid, it was meant
to encourage self-reliance on the part of the recipient
instead of dependence (Peking Review, 1964).

China also

sought to portray the U.S.S.R. as a member of the club
of rich nations by stressing the developmental gap between
the U.S.S.R. and the Third World.

For this reason, Chinese

delegates have consistently tried to force the Soviet
Union out of Afro-Asian organizations as a means of iden
tifying it with the developed western countries.

On some

occasions China even resorted to racial slogans to em
barrass the Soviet Union.

For instance at the Cairo

Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in 1962, in which Ghana
was represented, the Chinese stated that the Soviets by
virtue of being white could not be expected to have the
interests of Afro-Asians at heart.

The Chinese spokes

men is reported to have informed African delegates that
"These Europeans are all the same.

...

must hold together" (Daily N a t i o n , 1962).

We non-whites
Although there

is no reason to believe that the racial overtones of the
Chinese statements were taken seriously by any of the
African delegates present, the Soviet Union was however
clearly put at a disadvantageous position by the Chinese
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who managed to reduce the Soviet delegation to observer
status at a planning meeting for the Conference.

Although

Ghana's delegate did not go as far as the Guinean Foreign
Minister, who likened Soviet claims of being partly an
Asian country to U.S. claims on Puerto Rico, he too seemed
to have been convinced by the Chinese argument that the
Soviets had no place in Afro-Asian Solidarity organiza
tions (Legvold, 1970).
Chinese aid was successful on specific occasions in
preventing the isolation of China in Ghana and other Afri
can countries which Moscow sought to promote through her
aid.

For instance, when Chou-En-Lai visited Ghana in 1964,

he and Nkrumah agreed about the desirability of convening
an Afro-Asian Conference.

When the preparatory meeting

for the conference was held in Indonesia in April, 1964,
China once more managed to upstage the Soviet Union.

She

persuaded the sub-committee responsible for invitations,
in which Ghana was represented, not to issue an invitation
to the U.S.S.R.
On the whole Nkrumah seems to have favored remaining
neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute as exemplified by his
message to the Executive Meeting of the Afro-Asian Peo
ples Solidarity Organization (A.A.P.S.O.) meeting in
Nicosia in 1963.

Because of his belief that only Afro-

Asian solidarity could facilitate the struggle against
colonialism in Africa he advised the Executive Committee

j
i

i
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in this way:
Our goal should be to seek the unity of the
socialist countries, for it is only through
this unity that they can support us in our
struggle against imperialism and colonialism.
It should be our concern. . . to appeal to
China and the Soviet Union . . .to eliminate
their differences (Radio Ghana, 30 Sept. 1963).
But inspite of this inclination it is clear that after
the Congo crisis, Nkrumah's disappointment in the U.S.
handling of the matter moved him ideologically closer to
the Chinese than to the U.S.S.R.

Unlike their Soviet

counterparts, the Chinese emphasized the primacy of a
political struggle over economic struggle and therefore
sanctioned violent revolution where the Soviets advocated
gradual, long term evolution toward socialism.

It was

because of this convergence of views that Nkrumah was to
depend more on China for the operation of guerilla train
ing centres in which freedom fighters from Southern Africa
underwent their training.

The Soviets had initially par

ticipated in the venture but later withdrew.

Ghana also

sent some employees from its Bureau of African Affairs
to China to undergo training in Guerilla warfare.

As

their influence grew, the Chinese even advised Nkrumah
to form a peoples' militia, whose effective organization,
it has been suggested by some, could have prevented the
array take-over (Thompson, 1969).

On this level China was

successful in portraying the Soviet Union as a status-quo
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country which relegated the revolutionary movement to
second priority in preference for detente with the United
States.
The Soviet Union has always been sensitive about the
tendency of some Third World countries to group her with
the western countries in the North-South dialogue about
the need for a new world economic order.

Thus Soviet

policy makers have staunchly defended themselves against
charges that they ought to give out more aid to poor
countries by pointing out that they were never partici
pants in the systematic colonial exploitation of these
countries’ resources and therefore have no binding duty
to redress the imbalances.

In an article on Soviet trade

and aid to less developed countries, a Soviet spokesman
indignantly stated that Soviet economic aid is an expression
of ". . . the international duty of the proletariat of
the countries of victorious socialism" and should not be
interpreted as an obligation of a rich country to help a
poor country.

He said the Soviet Union was opposed to

"one sided demands of some developing countries" which
divided states not according to their socio-economic char
acter but on the basis of 'wealth' on the principle of
"rich north and poor south" (Smirnov, 1970-71, p. 157).
And yet one finds that this is exactly what the Chinese
were doing in Ghana and other parts of Africa; portraying
the U.S.S.R. as a member of the club of rich nations and
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therefore pursuing similar aid policies as those of the
western countries.

Here the Chinese capitalized on the

difference between themselves and the Soviets regarding
the operational methods of technical assistance.

They

pointed out that their experts, unlike Soviet and Wes
tern experts did not demand special privileges and had
the same standard of living as the experts of the reci
pient country.

In emphasizing this point, a represen

tative of the Peking-based Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau
noted the difference between this aspect of Chinese aid
and that of the Soviet Union in which a Soviet expert,
before leaving home, insists "that his many requests be
satisfied:

He demands a villa with air conditioning in

each room, a fine car and local servants" (Peking Review,
17 March 1967, p. 27).

Here the Chinese did score points

against the Soviets because of the reputation they estab
lished for themselves, not only in Ghana but other places
like Tanzania, where they were known for living a rela
tively simpler life than their Soviet counterparts.

They

also had the advantage of not being too particular about
their surroundings unlike the Soviets who generally pre
ferred working in urban centres.

Thus in Ghana Soviet

experts were concentrated in urban areas like Accra,
Tamale, Kumasi.

This could partly explain why they re

ceived relatively bigger salaries than the Chinese.

In

contrast, Chinese experts in Ghana were only paid main
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tenance allowances by the Ghana government.
barrassed the Soviets greatly.

This em

It has been reported

that Soviet teachers in Ghana received salaries that
were sometimes larger than some of their western counter
parts.

For instance, while the Ghanaian government had

to pay between NC 1,600 - 2,000 p.a. for each Soviet
teacher in the period 1963 - 1966 comparable figures for
British volunteer teachers averaged between NC 1,300 and
NC 1,400 per year (Uphoff, 1970).
The competition between Moscow and Peking intensi
fied greatly in 1964, though not as vehemently as in other
parts of the world where it threatened to get out of hand
e.g.

In 1964 a Soviet technician in Nepal was said to

have accused the Chinese of trying to sabotage the Panauti
hydroelectric project being built with Soviet aid by re
moving stones from and damaging the only road over which
supplies were carried to the job site (Goldman, 1967).
In Ghana such excesses were avoided but the Chinese made
a move to maintain their political momentum by extending
Ghana yet another long-term,

interest free loan of

L8 million to be used in the country's Seven Year Develop
ment Plan.

The timing of the loan seems to have been cal

culated to win Nkrumah's support for the Second Bandung
Conference which was to be held in Algiers.

If her plan

was to undermine Soviet political gains in Ghana, using
her meagre resources, this seems to have worked as she
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managed to impress Ghanian officials with the easier
terms of her aid and the unpretentiousness of their per
sonnel.

The Chinese could have viewed only with great

satisfaction their aid efforts in Ghana to have heard a
Ghanaian official proclaim:
When the Chinese say they will give you a glass
they will not change their word.
The Soviets
are not like that, they can change their minds.
By the way they behaved you would think they
were building the whole of Ghana (Ogunsanwo,
1974, p. 145).
One study reaffirms this receptivity by pointing out
that the Chinese were more accommodating and considerate
than most donors in Ghana.

The researcher of this study

says he was told in one of his many interviews with
Ghanaian officials that the Chinese were more flexible
than other donors; e.g. if they were taking a geological
survey and found the drillings consistent, they were
willing to cut costs of a project whereas Soviet experts
would insist on fulfilling the

'plan1 in every detail

(Uphoff, 1970).
All that we have mentioned above regarding the role
of the Sino-Soviet dispute in undercutting Soviet poli
tical gains which were supposed to result from aid,
should not however be construed to mean that Peking suf
fered no set-backs in its relationship with Ghana.
were several hurdles between the two countries.
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was critized by Ghana for alleged purchases of grain
from South Africa, her refusal to sign the test ban
treaty of 1963 and the handling of the Algerian Coup
that toppled Ben Bella.

There were even points of dis

agreement on the administration of her aid.

For instance,

the Chinese were seen to be unnecessarily adding to the
cost of their projects by insisting on bringing even
workmen from China to build the structures and install
equipment for their factories (Uphoff, 1970).

These

problems are not however our concern at this point.

Our

main concern is the Chinese presence in Ghana in as far
as it ran counter to Soviet aims of using aid for poli
tical reasons.

From the data we have presented so far,

it is clear that China's own aid program posed a problem
for Soviet policy.
In the final analysis it can be said that even
though China suffered a serious set-back to its African
policy just like the Soviet Union, when Nkrumah was
ousted, the Chinese came out of the debacle with a bet
ter image than the Soviets.

Whereas both countries

had their technicians expelled from Ghana at the time
of the coup, Moscow waited only a few weeks before
granting diplomatic recognition to those who overthrew
Nkrumah.

The Chinese on the otherhand kept their dis

tance from the N.L.C. government as a gesture of solid
arity to its one time ally and an assurance to those
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still in power elsewhere in Africa, of the depth of
Chinese support for its allies.

Significantly Nkrumah

was in China at the time of the coup, on his way to
Hanoi.

Although the Chinese already knew about the coup,

they gave him all the treatment befitting a head of State.
The same enthusiasm was not shown by the Soviets who
were not very keen to deal with him when he passed through
the U.S.S.R., and were instead relieved when he proceeded
to Guinea.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POSITVE AND NEGATIVE
EFFECTS OF SOVIET AID
Few countries in Africa today would contemplate
carrying out their development plans without external
economic aid.

In Ghana's case this dependence on foreign

aid has become more crucial at present than at any time
in the country's history because of skyrocketing oil
prices, declining agricultural productivity and the high
cost of imported goods.

Ghana's national economy today

is in its worst shape since independence and at the time
of writing the country's fuel bill is expected to equal
the total revenue from exports of cocoa and the govern
ment has had to impose severe rationing of petroleum pro
ducts (African B u sin e s s , December, 1980, p. 12).

What

all this means is that for Ghana external economic aid
will remain an integral part of the country's economic
and political life for a long time to come; short of a
discovery of oil supplies.

Thus the major question

facing Ghanaian policy makers is not whether or not to
seek aid at all; the question rather is which source to
tap and what ramifications does aid have on the political
and economic development of the country.

If anything,

the Nkrumah period has provided a valuable lesson about
128
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the operative method of Soviet aid and its costs and
benefits to the recipient.

Since this study has followed

the approach of political analysis over economic analysis
throughout, even in this chapter political factors are em
phasized over economic ones.

This is done for the reason

that the purposes of Soviet aid in Ghana were mainly poli
tical .
The main objective of economic aid should be the pro
motion of self-sustaining economic development that will
eventually facilitate the political independence of the
recipient.

While one must admit that any amount of aid

does somehow save the recipient the burden of extra sav
ings it is clear from the results of this study that Sov
iet aid in Ghana was not geared at promoting any selfsustaining economic development.

Despite claims of good

intentions of contributing to the economic liberation of
African economies from monopolistic exploitation, in prac
tice the Soviets turned out to be penny pinching.

In

Ghana they gave as little as possible while expecting
great political dividends.

As this study has already in

dicated that the major purpose of Soviet aid in Ghana
was to counter U.S. and Chinese influence, one discerns
this trend when examining the timing of Soviet aid.
level of aid fluctuated according to the intensity of
competition from other actors.

For instance, the so-

called 'pragmatism' of the Brezhnew regime came into
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play at the time when U.S. interest in Ghana was at its
lowest.

Content to bask in the legacy of the Kennedy

Africa policy which had won good will for the U.S., the
Johnson Administration neglected Africa and expended its
energies on the

'Great Society* at home.

Because Soviet

aid was inspired by competition with the U.S., the Brez
hnev regime became complacent in the absence of that com
petition.

At the same time China was not posing such a

major threat due to its preoccupation with the cultural
revolution.

It was only then that the Soviets resorted

to hard bargaining and scrutinizing Ghanaian proposed
projects more closely.

Factors like economic feasibility

and pay off were now emphasized.

For instance, in 1965

Soviet engineers advised against financing a $100 million
Bui Dam project which Nkrumah requested because they said
it was not economically viable (Legvold, 1970).

Regard

less of the merits of the experts' arguments in this par
ticular case, there was nevertheless a clear pattern un
der the Brezhnew regime to relegate Ghana and the rest
of Africa on a low list of Soviet priorities.

The ten

dency was to concentrate more on improving the U.S.S.R.'s
own economy rather than salvage flagging economies of
developing countries such as Ghana.

At a time when Ghana's

foreign debt rose due to inability to finance imports from
the western countries and the fall in cocoa prices the
country had turned more to the U.S.S.R. for imports.
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But the result put Ghana in a financial bind as large
quantities of cocoa sold to the U.S.S.R. were not match
ed by similarly huge purchases of Soviet goods.

And

Ghana was meanwhile losing otherwise valuable convert
ible currency because the Soviets were paying for cocoa
with rubles.

In 1962 the Soviets had agreed to pay for

55% of their purchases in pounds sterling to alleviate
the problem.

But this figure was lowered to 40% in 1964

and by 1965 it had declined to 30% (Goldman, 1967).

At

about this time articles began appearing in the Soviet
press stating the need to build socialism at home rather
than continue pouring aid into Third World nations.

One

such article noted in particular that "The best way to
fulfill our internationalist duty to the working people
of the entire world is the construction of socialism and
communism in the U.S.S.R. and the socialist bloc" (Pravda,
27th October, 1965).

This inward looking strategy re

vealed, if anything, that Soviet aid was not in unison
with Ghana's national interests which happened to be the
attainment of economic self-sufficiency.

This lack of

commitment by the U.S.S.R. had a negative effect of
actually inhibiting economic development and creating a
perpetual dependency of Ghana's economy on the western
countries who surpassed Soviet efforts in the aid busi
ness.

The amount of Soviet aid to Ghana was so insigni

ficant and by failing to provide a base for the economic
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"take off" that was needed, did in actual fact reinforce
the economic dependence on the West that Nkrumah was
trying to minimize.

By 1965 Moscow was even prepared to

advise Ghana to utilize western and multilateral aid
(Fedorov, 1965), if this was going to absolve the U.S.S.R.
of any responsibility to extend further aid to Ghana.
While Soviet aid failed to contribute much to econo
mic independence, it seems to have had a different effect
on the recipient's political independence even if this
was for a limited period.

Despite its limited scope it

contributed to its recipient's political development by
making possible the pursuit of an independent foreign
policy.

By merely providing an alternative to traditional

sources of aid it had the effect of strengthening Ghana's
bargaining position with western donors.

For instance,

at the time when Nkrumah became increasingly worried that
the Volta negotiations with the United States might fail,
he broadened his contact with the Soviet Union and wanted
to leave it as an alternative source of capital.

Khrush

chev informed a Ghanaian delegation visiting the Crimea
in 1960 that if the U.S. delayed over the Volta Project,
he would build it for them just as he had built the Aswan
Dam for Egypt.

Even though the U.S. government was dis

gruntled about Nkrumah's foreign policy it was wary about
the political repercussions of cancelling the scheme
(Thompson, 1969).
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The presence of Soviet aid made it possible for the
first time for Nkrumah to conduct his foreign policy in
accordance with his world view and what he perceived to
be Ghana's national interests without fear of western re
tributions.

While a case can be made to show that the

U.S.S.R. does use aid as an instrument of political co
ercion, this was not the case in Ghana.

In the past the

Soviet Union has not hesitated to exert severe economic
pressure on those countries of importance to it which hap
pen to adopt anti-Soviet policies such as Yugoslavia in
1957, China in 1960 and Albania in 1961, but in Ghana one
of the major attractions of Soviet aid was its general
avoidance of imposing explicit political conditions.

This

quality of Soviet aid is described by one analyst this
way:
The Soviet Union has indeed focused its aid
on those countries pursuing a neutralist or
pro-Soviet foreign policy; and there have
been occasions involving Afghanistan and Iran
when an aid offer was linked to signing a
neutrality and non-aggression pact. . . .
But these occasions are rare and as a rule
the U.S.S.R. has conspicuously sought to
avoid the imposition of explicit political
stipulations such as those mentioned with
American food to India, which prescribe a
specific stance on some foreign policy issue
by the recipient (Walters, 1970, p. 165).
Inorder to give an adequate assessment of this parti
cular aspect of Soviet aid it is inevitable to make some
comparison with U.S. aid to Ghana during N k r u m a h 1s time.
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It is not the intention of this paper to put U.S. aid
policy in Ghana on trial but at the same time its role
in the ultimate impact of Soviet aid cannot be ignored
without distorting the overall picture of foreign aid
in Ghana.

For it was perhaps by avoiding some of the

shortcomings of U.S. aid that the U.S.S.R. managed to en
hance its image while contributing to the recipient's
political development.

U.S. aid to Ghana though well in-

tentioned as exemplified by what Kennedy once said when
he cautioned that the United States should not try to re
make the world in its image nor use aid to dictate policies
of recipients (Meyersohn, 1965), nevertheless came to be
regarded by Nkrumah as an instrument of political mani
pulation (Nkrumah, 1965).

Even during the New Frontier's

identification with African aspirations the operational
method of U.S. aid in Ghana seemed to indicate a lack of
understanding for problems of African political develop
ment.

Beginning with the decision to finance the Volta

Project, Ghana was under pressure to conduct its foreign
policy in a manner approved of by the U.S. and the pro
ject's success was imperiled on those occasions when
Nkrumah seemed oblivious of U.S. interests e.g. in his
criticism of U.S. policy in the Congo, especially after
Lumumba's death.

Thus before the final undertaking of

the project he was constantly reminded of the need to
co-operate if he wished to receive U.S. aid (House of
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Representatives, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 1964).
On other occasions aid was actually suspended or refused
when policy disagreements surfaced.

For instance in

1963 Kennedy instructed the A.I.D. not to extend any
further long-term credits to Ghana on account of what
was termed a hostile foreign policy by Washington (Schlesinger, 1965).

Two years later the U.S. government re

fused Ghana badly needed food under its PL480 program
when Nkrumah's book, Neo-Colonialism was released.

This

gesture carried out in full the purpose of food aid which
was enunciated by Humphrey, one of the architects of the
program, this way:
. . .Before people can do anything they
have got to eat.
And if you are looking
for a way to get people to lean on you
and to be dependent on you; it seems food
dependence would be terrific (Bhagat, 1980,
p. 79).
Ghana imports a lot of food and is therefore highly vul
nerable to pressures that have any bearing on the supply
of consumer needs in this regard.

It is the view of some

scholars that the United States helped in world economic
sanctions against Nkrumah in 1964-65 by being unsympathetic
to Ghana's balance of payments problems and the interna
tional freeze contributed to Nkrumah's inability to satis
fy internal demands (Wallerstein, 1975).

And when Ghana

ians could not have basic food stuffs like flour and
milk, the C.P.P.

government found itself out of office.
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The Soviet Union in its economic aid program was
virtually opposed to food aid as a component of the pro
gram because of what it viewed as a tendency for reci
pients of such aid to postpone painful decisions that
have to be made inorder to break the cycle of dependence.
It is probable that the Soviets were making a virtue out
of necessity because of their disadvantage in agricultural
development as compared to the United States.

This is

probably so because of the bad performance of their State
farms in Ghana; a factor which was not helped by the de
cision to reduce Soviet agronomists from 42 in 1964 to
only 20 at the end of 1965 (Legvold, 1970).

However the

essential observation to be made here is that the exten
sion of Soviet aid which consisted largely of industrial
equipment and products was not regarded as manipulative.
There was no attempt by Moscow to change Ghanaian posi
tions in foreign affairs through either withdrawal or
suspension of aid.

And contrary to popular belief there

were policy disagreements between Ghana and the U.S.S.R.
For instance, on matters of disarmament, which Nkrumah
viewed seriously, Ghana showed its independence in its
policy stance.

In both 1961 and 1962 Ghana condemned in

no uncertain terms the Soviet act of nuclear testing.
The government of Ghana was also harsh in its criticism
of Soviet handling of the Iraqi coup that ousted the
Kassim regime.

Kassim had been credited with legalizing
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the Iraqi Communist party and withdrawing Iraq from the
Baghdad Pact.

So when the U.S.S.R. gave a speedy recogni

tion to the new government, Ghana condemned it for sacri
ficing Iraqi Communists who were being suppressed by the
new government.

The U.S.S.R. also earned the wrath of

the Ghanaian press when it refused to recognize the govern
ment of Togo after the assassination of Olympio in 1963;
an act that was seen in Ghana as an effort to ingratiate
Nigeria (Legvold, 1970).

On such occasions the Soviet

Union desisted from using the aid weapon to discourage
Ghanaian criticism of its policies.
One cannot conclude this chapter without pointing
out the final irony of Soviet aid strategy.

The Soviets

learned in Ghana that they were not immune to the problem
afflicting most donors who are politically inspired and
that is the problem of preserving the political gains
made.

Their aid had gone not to build socialism but to

strengthen state capitalism which benefitted only a few.
But once they realized that they had developed vested in
terests in the country through their aid program it became
difficult not to revert to outright opportunism, from
speedy recognition of the N.L.C. which had ousted Nkrumah
to even making food aid part of their program in Ghana
ten years later.

Thirteen years after the coup that

gave a jolt to their Africa policy they found themselves
lavishing compliments on a government that had fallen
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out of favor with the majority of its citizens.
to portray Acheampong as 'progressive'

By trying

at a time when he

became unpopular (West Afri c a , February, 1979) the Soviet
Union was demonstrating once more how economic aid needs
the preservation of the status quo to remain effective;
a factor which might not necessarily work to the advan
tage of ordinary citizens.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The confusion that emerged among Soviet theoreti
cians in the wake of the 1966 coup illustrates better
the failure of economic aid as an effective instrument
of foreign policy.

When the army struck on that day,

it rendered invalid some of the basic theoretical as*

-

sumptions guiding Soviet policy in Africa.

It was only

after this coup that the U.S.S.R. discovered that gross
analytical errors had been made by the theorists in their
writings on military regimes in Africa.

These writings

had systematically exempted 'progressive1 regimes such
as Nkrumah's from possible military coups because of
the belief that the ruling parties in these countries
were responsible for the political training of the army
(Paveltsev, 1966).

Before the Ghanaian coup Africanists

in the U.S.S.R. welcomed coups in countries such as
Nigeria as these were seen as a remedy against reaction
ary governments that followed the capitalist way of
development.
What is more disturbing though is the barrage of
criticism that Soviet Africanists hurled at Nkrumah
after the coup.

Between 1963 and 1964 Ghana was the

Soviet Union's most favored ally in Sub-Saharan Africa
139
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especially after the set-backs Moscow encountered in
Guinea.

Nkrumah had been awarded the Lenin Peace Prize

and Ghana had been complimented for its "great progress
in building socialism" (Pravda, 13th January, 1962).
Apart from a few commmentaries that pointed at the need
to build up productive forces, most of the writing on
Ghana was positive.

But within two weeks of the coup

Soviet commentators had nothing complimentary to say
about the man who had been regarded as 'pro-communist'
in the W e s t .

Nkrumah was blamed for everything from

"insufficient involvement in political and state life
by the broad popular masses" to the neglect of the pea
santry and the absence of mass parties (Izvestiya,
6 March, 1966).

One wonders why such observations were

not publicly made at the time Nkrumah was in power un
less of course a deduction can be made that at the time,
Moscow was concerned more with her interests rather than
the political survival of Nkrumah.

This can only lead

one to the conclusion that Soviet policy in Ghana was
opportunistic.

Such opportunism was more conspicuous

during the Brezhnev regime than under Khrushchev's leader
ship.

For instance when it became clear to the Soviets

that the Johnson Administration was prepared to follow
the recommendations of the Clay Report submitted by
'The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free
World' the Soviets reacted by reducing their own aid to
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Ghana and other African countries.

The Clay Report which

had been recommended to Kennedy but later used by Johnson,
had argued that the United States should reduce its aid
package to Africa because the continent's geographical
position made it less vulnerable to Soviet influence.
It was only then that the U.S.S.R. subjected its Ghanaian
and the whole of its African policy to what has been
termed by some the

'dictates of a cost-benefit analysis.'

Moscow gave more attention to Vietnam and the Middle East
as these areas became more important in its global in
terests than

Africa was (Cohn, 1973).

In the light of these facts policy makers in Ghana
and other African states may well ask themselves if the
U.S.S.R. does indeed provide a reliable source of economic
aid.

The answer to this question is not as simple as it

might appear.

The Ghanaian experience has indicated that

the Soviet Union as a source of aid has the quality of
reliability only in so far as it is not willing to use
its aid punitively.

This is proven by the fact that Mos

cow was willing to continue its aid program even after
the coup despite the provocations of the N.L.C. govern
ment which ranged from seizing Soviet trawlers and ex
pulsion of Soviet diplomats.

Moscow's aid program has

been constant in the sense that it remained operative
even at some of the most difficult times in SovietGhanaian relations when there have been serious strains
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in the donor-recipient relationship such as happened un 
der the N.L.C. and the Busia governments.

When their

projects were suspended, the Soviets waited their turn
until they were asked back to complete what they had al
ready started.

The readiness which they have shown in

dealing with governments of every ideological complexion
does not necessarily derive from their commitment to pro
mote Ghana's national interests as such.

It is more a

consequence of the intricacies of the aid business which
make it almost impossible for donors to withdraw from a
particular country after initiating an aid program.

So

on that score alone the Soviet Union can be regarded as
reliable in that successive Ghanaian governments, unless
they initiate the break themselves, can expect to con
tinue receiving aid regardless of their political orien
tation.

Whether or not that aid is adequate is a dif

ferent matter.

It is apparent however that the respon

sibility to utilize whatever aid Moscow offers, in a
constructive manner, remains with the Ghanaian govern
ments themselves.

The fact that the U.S.S.R. will not

use its aid to coerce the recipient into effecting socio
political changes domestically has a direct bearing on
how effective that aid can be.

For instance, the govern

ment can use that aid to increase industrial production
since Moscow's aid is aimed at developing the public
sector.

It is significant that between 1963 and 1967 the
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government's share in Ghana's industrial production rose
from 27% to 43%.

A start was at least made in heavy in

dustry especially in areas such as metallurgy, engineer
ing and chemicals (Amin, 1973).

The Soviet Union was not

totally responsible for this development but its aid did
contribute to the effort.

Successive Ghanaian govern

ments can also benefit from future Soviet aid in those
areas where their economy is at its weakest.

The inade

quacy of food production for example has brought an in
crement in the level of food imports and the U.S.S.R.
has shown the willingness recently to enter into food
aid (African Contemporary R e c o r d , 1977/78).

In another

crucial sector of oil imports, Ghana can benefit from
its contact with the U.S.S.R.

Since 1965 the U.S.S.R.

has been supplying Ghana with some part of its oil needs.
About 595,300 tons of crude oil was supplied to the re
finery at Tema in 1965 and these deliveries continued
after Nkrumah was ousted.

The Soviets did not withhold

oil supplies to the military government that toppled
Nkrumah; these exports fell to 452,600

tons in 1967

from 603,500 tons in 1966 only because the N.L.C. had
decided to import its oil from the West (Klinghoffer,
1977).
In concluding this paper the author would like to
state her belief in the idea that the major task of
economic development should be shared by both the poor
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countries of the world and their rich neighbors in the
northern hemisphere.

The governments of Africa will

have to avoid shirking their responsibilities by blaming
all their problems on Western or Soviet imperialism.
They can contribute more to the development effort by
bringing to a halt the systematic plundering of their
resources by a few elites who take more out of the
economy than they put in.

But this will need a basic

*

change in the thinking of those privileged to dominate
the political life of their countries.

But in the same

token the rich countries of the world, which include the
Soviet Union, owe it to the majority of mankind to re
verse in a short time the grossly unfair trade practices
which have condemned countries like Ghana to depressing
levels of poverty.

This author subscribes to the Pre-

bisch Thesis which argues that the Third World Countries
will forever remain poor as long as the terms of trade
work against them.

This is based on the fact that while

the price of raw materials and staple commodities such
as cocoa which Ghana exports, have been falling, the
prices of manufactured goods from the developed world
have been rising.

The unprecedented avarice of inter

national oil companies and the O.P.E.C. countries has
exerted a further burden on the people of Africa.

These

conditions, together with the morbid narcissism of the
ruling elites render economic aid, whether from the Soviet
Union or the West, meaningless.
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